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Twenty-two thousand ranchers graze livestock on federal
land.1  Yet, ranchers grazing on public land represent only 3% of
the beef producers in the United States.2  Ranchers with federal
grazing permits represent less than one-quarter of the total num-
ber of beef producers in the eleven western states3 where federal
grazing is concentrated.4  Even within this group of public-land
ranchers, the majority of the benefits are conferred on an aston-
ishingly small number of individuals and corporations: the largest
2000 permits, approximately 10% of the total, account for two-
thirds of the available forage.5  As a result, a tiny fraction—less
than 0.25%—of the cattle growers in the United States consumes
the vast majority of the forage on public land.6
Until the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) in 1934,
grazing livestock on public land was virtually unregulated.7  Con-
gress intended that the TGA would provide for the “orderly use,
improvement, and development” of federal rangeland.8  To this
end, Congress provided the Interior Secretary with the authority
to create grazing districts, promulgate regulations, issue permits,
and charge a fee for grazing the federal range.9
After passing the TGA, Congress waited more than forty years
before it passed the next significant law governing federal graz-
ing, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA).10  FLPMA established the standard permit tenure,11
1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RANGELAND REFORM
’94: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-65 (1994).
2 Id.  at 3-66 tbl.3-15.
3 Id.  (approximately 22% of beef producers in the eleven western states have fed-
eral permits or leases).
4 See id.  at 3-66 tbl.3-15, 3-67 (93% of all federal permittees operate in Washing-
ton, Oregon, California, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Montana).
5 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO/RCED-92-213FS, RANGE-
LAND MANAGEMENT: PROFILE OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S GRAZ-
ING ALLOTMENTS AND PERMITS 16 & fig. 2.1 (1992), available at  http://
archive.gao.gov/d32t10/146906.pdf.
6 In the forty-eight contiguous states, there are 906,700 cattle producers. BUREAU
OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 1, at 3-66.  Therefore, the largest 2000 permits re-
present no more than 0.22% of the producers in the contiguous United States.  The
actual percentage may be lower since a single producer may hold multiple permits.
7 See  Karl N. Arruda & Christopher Watson, The Rise and Fall of Grazing Re-
form , 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 413, 421 (1997).
8 Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, § 2, 48 Stat. 1269, 1270 (1934).
9 Id.  §§ 1-3, 48 Stat. 1269-70.
10 See  Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90
Stat. 2743.
11 Id.  § 402(a)-(b).
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required the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to con-
duct a study on the value of federal forage,12 and required per-
mits to include allotment-management plans.13  Two years later,
in 1978, Congress passed the Public Rangelands Improvement
Act (PRIA).14  The most significant contribution of PRIA was
the establishment of a formula for determining the federal graz-
ing fee.15  Although these two statutes improved federal range-
land management, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has
failed to exercise its modest authority to limit the ecological dam-
age inflicted by intensive grazing.16  As a result, the negative en-
vironmental impacts of the federal grazing program continue to
be substantial.
Although few people directly benefit from grazing on federal
lands,17 the economic and environmental burden borne by the
public is substantial.  The land managed by the BLM is largely
arid and rugged; it damages easily and recovers slowly.18  As a
12 Id.  § 401(a).
13 Id.  § 402(d).  The allotment management plan requirement was ultimately very
short-lived.  When FLPMA was originally passed, the Secretary of the Interior was
only required to include allotment management plans for permits issued prior to
October 1, 1988. Id.  § 402(d).  However, when the Public Rangelands Improvement
Act was passed two years later, Congress eliminated the requirement and left the
inclusion of an allotment management plan to the discretion of the Secretary. See
Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, § 8, 92 Stat. 1803,
1807.  An allotment management plan describes the manner in which an allotment is
to be grazed. See  43 U.S.C. § 1702(k) (2006).  It is “basically [a] land use plan tai-
lored to [a] specific grazing permit[ ].”  George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Pub-
lic Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate , 14
ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1983).
14 See  Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat.
1803.
15 Id.  § 6(a).  Although PRIA expressly limited the applicability of its grazing fee
formula to the period from 1979 through 1985, the formula’s applicability has been
extended indefinitely by executive order.  Exec. Order No. 12,548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985
(Feb. 14, 1986).
16 See  Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM’s Management of Livestock
Grazing on the Public Lands? , 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 572 (1994); cf.  George Cam-
eron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management V: Prescriptions for Re-
form , 14 ENVTL. L. 497, 540-41 (1984) (suggesting changes in BLM’s management
philosophy). Coggins also blamed the failure of PRIA and FLPMA on the lack of
clear statutory goals and judges’ failure to require the BLM to adhere to the Acts’
terms. Id.  at 504-07.
17 Only 22,000 ranchers graze their cattle on public land. See BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., supra note 1, at 3-65.  By way of comparison, 31,932 people ran the New
York Marathon in 2002.  Bobby Cuza, Ladies’ Day at the Races , NEWSDAY (New
York), Nov. 4, 2002, at A8.
18 WELFARE RANCHING: THE SUBSIDIZED DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN
WEST xiii (George Wuerthner & Mollie Matteson eds., 2002).
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result, livestock grazing has significantly degraded these fragile
landscapes.  By the BLM’s own account, only a third of riparian
areas on the land it manages function properly.19  Livestock graz-
ing contributes to the decline of native trout species20 and de-
grades spawning and rearing habitat for imperiled salmon.21
Grazing activities are also implicated in the increase in the sever-
ity of wildfires.22  The environmental costs of grazing are com-
pounded by significant economic costs.  The fee charged for an
Animal Unit Month (AUM) by the BLM does not even cover
the cost of administering the grazing program23 and is a fraction
of its fair market value.24
Traditional notions of democracy predict that political repre-
sentatives who promote the interests of their constituencies will
dominate political races.25  Therefore, one would expect that
when the burden of a federal program is borne by the majority
for the benefit of the few, the political branches would reallocate
the benefits and burdens.  Yet, with a few notable exceptions,
substantive grazing reform has not occurred.  The fact that Con-
gress has not undertaken grazing reforms calls into question the
predictive ability of traditional notions of representative
democracy.
19 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 1, at 4-24.
20 DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT THE PUBLIC
TROUGH 76-77 (1983).
21 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 1, at 4-28 to -29.
22 A. Joy Belsky & Dana M. Blumenthal, Effects of Livestock Grazing on Stand
Dynamics and Soils in Upland Forests of the Interior West , 11 CONSERVATION BIOL-
OGY 315, 319 (1997). Belsky and Blumenthal assert that wildfires are more intense
in areas that have been grazed by cattle for two reasons.  First, cattle consume the
fine fuels that would otherwise fuel periodic low-intensity fires.  Due to the absence
of low-intensity fires, the overall fuel loads are generally higher than in ungrazed
areas.  Second, cattle consume grass that would otherwise compete with conifer
seedlings for nutrients.  As a result, forests that have been grazed tend to be more
densely stocked than ungrazed forests. Id.  at 318-19.
23 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO/OCG-93-17TR, NATURAL
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ISSUES 19-20 (1992), available at  http://archive.gao.gov/
d36t11/148261.pdf.
24 An AUM on federal land cost $1.43 in 2002.  Press Release, Bureau of Land
Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2002 Grazing Fee Announced (Feb. 14, 2002),
available at  http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2002/pr020214_grazing.
htm.  The average cost of an AUM on private land in the eleven western states was
$12.50 in 2002. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICUL-
TURAL STATISTICS 2003 IX-42 tbl.9-43 (2003), available at  http://www.nass.usda.gov/
Publications/Ag_Statistics/agr03/03_ch9.pdf.
25 Jonathan Macey, Representative Democracy , 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49,
49-50 (1993).
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Public choice theory provides an alternate view of political de-
cision making.  Public choice theory suggests that small, well-or-
ganized interest groups pursuing concrete financial gain will have
a disproportionate impact on political bodies.26  Although ranch-
ing interests are spread across remote parts of the West, they
have successfully lobbied the federal government for favorable
access to public forage through organizations such as the Na-
tional Cattlemen’s Beef Association.  The cost of rangeland deg-
radation due to grazing is borne by the undifferentiated, distant
public, who generally lack firsthand knowledge of or a vested in-
terest in the federal range.
Under these circumstances, public choice theory predicts that
ranchers can have a disproportionate impact on political deci-
sions.  And indeed, the history of rangeland management sup-
ports this hypothesis.  Historically, ranching interests have
defeated most legislative attempts to reform grazing practices.27
Similarly, the executive branch has rarely exercised its broad au-
thority to regulate grazing under the TGA,28 FLPMA, and
PRIA.29
In 1993, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt attempted to
challenge this state of affairs by reforming public-lands grazing.30
Although it was not a particularly ambitious plan,31 Babbitt’s ini-
tiative was the first significant proposal to reform grazing prac-
26 Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple
Use” Failed , 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407 (1994) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991)).
27 See, e.g. , Westerners Defeat Babbitt Range Policy—Or Do They? , PUB. LAND
NEWS, Nov. 25, 1993, at 3, 3.
28 See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Pub-
lic Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act , 13 ENVTL. L. 1,
100-01 (1982).
29 See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management V:
Prescriptions for Reform , 14 ENVTL. L. 497, 504-07 (1984).
30 Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 58 Fed. Reg.
43,234, 43,234 (Aug. 13, 1993).
31 Critics of the BLM’s grazing program have advocated eliminating grazing
where its costs outweigh its benefits. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N
NO. GAO/RCED-92-12, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: BLM’S HOT DESERT GRAZ-
ING PROGRAM MERITS RECONSIDERATION 58 (1991), available at  http://
archive.gao.gov/d31t10/145487.pdf; Joseph M. Feller, ‘Til the Cows Come Home: The
Fatal Flaw in the Clinton Administration’s Public Lands Grazing Policy , 25 ENVTL.
L. 703, 704-05 (1995) (criticizing the grazing of fragile arid lands and noting that a
“rational approach would be to continue grazing only where its economic benefits
exceed its costs by a margin sufficient to justify its environmental impacts”).  How-
ever, Babbitt’s proposal failed to consider any programmatic reduction in the extent
of federal grazing.
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tices since the enactment of PRIA in 1978.  Despite his efforts to
build consensus for reform,32 Babbitt faced considerable opposi-
tion to his initial proposal.33  When he promulgated final regula-
tions, Babbitt’s attempts to reach a compromise had eliminated
or substantially weakened the key elements of the initial propo-
sal.34  Before the new grazing regulations could take effect,
ranching interests challenged the regulations in federal court.35
The case eventually found its way into the Supreme Court, where
in 2000, the Court unanimously upheld key provisions of Bab-
bitt’s grazing regulations as lawful exercises of his statutory
authority.36
The following year, George W. Bush was inaugurated as the
forty-third President of the United States.37  Bush replaced Sec-
retary Babbitt with Gale Norton, a disciple of former Secretary
James Watt.38  Two years later, on March 3, 2003, the BLM an-
32 See  Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 43,234 (“During the spring and summer of 1993, Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt held five meetings in the West . . . to obtain public views on rangeland
management.”); Westerners Defeat Babbitt Range Policy—Or Do They? , supra  note
27, at 3 (“Babbitt has promised to go to Denver every week for the next eight weeks
to talk with affected interest groups.”).
33 In response to a bill based on Babbitt’s reform proposal, Senator Malcolm Wal-
lop (R-Wyo.) addressed the Senate, “I tell you my friends and colleagues, this is not
a grazing issue . . . .  This is an issue of a war on the West.  This is an issue of the
assault of the Secretary of Interior to try to gain control over the West.” Senate
Refuses to Consider Range Policy Changes—Thus Far , PUB. LANDS NEWS, Oct. 28,
1993, at 1, 2.
34 Between the announcement of the initial proposal and promulgation of the fi-
nal rule, Babbitt made two major changes.  First, he eliminated an increase in the
grazing fee. See Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed.
Reg. 9894, 9899 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).  Second,
he gutted national standards and guidelines. See id.  at 9902.
35 The Public Lands Council’s lawsuit was filed in the Wyoming District Court on
July 27, 1995. Ranchers Sue Government over Rules for Grazing , SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 28, 1995, at A3; see also  Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior Sec’y, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Wyo. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 154 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 1998), opinion am. and su-
perseded on reh’g , 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’d  529 U.S. 728 (2000) [herein-
after Pub. Lands Council I].  Babbitt’s grazing regulations did not take effect until
August 21, 1995. See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60
Fed. Reg. at 9894.
36 See  Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 731 (2000) [hereinafter Pub.
Lands Council III].
37 Stewart M. Powell, George W. Bush Becomes 43rd President , TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), Jan. 21, 2001, at A1.
38 James Risen, Vote Lifts Conservative Land Groups , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001,
at A15.
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nounced that it would rewrite its grazing regulations.39  In its Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the BLM proposed
eliminating many of the reforms in Babbitt’s grazing regulations,
including reforms affecting title to range improvements, title to
water rights, and the definition of grazing preference.40
Traditional theories of representative democracy would not
have predicted the arc traced by rangeland reform.  Public choice
theory provides a more satisfactory explanation of the death of
Babbitt’s reform efforts.  Although public choice theory cannot
account for all of the factors leading to the death of rangeland
reform, it offers meaningful insights into the political realities of
federal rangeland management.
This Article examines the lessons of public choice theory in the
context of rangeland reform.  Part I briefly surveys public choice
theory.  Part II explores Babbitt’s initial proposal to reform pub-
lic land grazing.  From the apogee of his initial proposal, Part III
traces the erosion of his reform efforts.  Part IV then discusses
legal and judicial challenges to Babbitt’s regulations.  Part V pro-
ceeds to examine the second Bush administration’s efforts to re-
voke rangeland reform, while Part VI applies public choice
theory to the death of rangeland reform.
This Article concludes that public choice theory predicts that
significant and rapid reform of public rangeland policy is un-
likely.  Due to the disproportionate influence of ranchers on the
political process, legislative reforms are unlikely.  Ranchers will
also have a significant impact on administrative reform efforts.
However, as Babbitt’s reform effort demonstrates, modest ad-
ministrative reforms are possible.  Therefore, the most promising
path to rangeland reform is gradual administrative reform.
I
THE BASICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
The influence of special interests has been a concern since the
Founding.  James Madison was particularly concerned about the
potential for factions to interfere with the political process.41
39 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Proposed Amendments to the
BLM’s Grazing Administration Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9964, 9964 (Mar. 3, 2003).
40 Id.  at 9965-66.
41 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation , 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 280 (1988) (citing
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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However, over the past two centuries, as Americans have grown
more cynical, we have grown to accept that special interests wield
substantial political influence.42  Despite this growing cynicism,
economic theory illustrates why special interests are so
influential.
Public choice theory is an economic theory of law creation.  In
its most basic form, public choice theory views political actors as
rational economic actors who are motivated solely by re-elec-
tion.43  The theory predicts that legislators will enact laws that
they believe will lead to their re-election.44
Interest-group theory is a branch of public choice theory that
examines the influence that interest groups have when legislation
is created by economically rational legislators.45  The basic teach-
ing of the interest-group theory is that small, well-organized
groups seeking to protect a narrow interest by opposing changes
to the status quo will have an undue influence on the law-making
process.46  The comparative weakness of large groups seeking
broad remedies is due in part to the free-rider problem.  Simply
stated, the free-rider problem is that when the benefits to be
reaped are widely shared, many will fail to take action on the
assumption that they will reap the benefits of someone else’s
hard work.47  The free-rider problem is most effectively over-
come by small groups promising concrete benefits.48  When
members of an organization stand to receive concrete benefits
from its actions, its members are less likely to free-ride and are
more likely to actively support the organization’s efforts.
Public choice theory predicts that new legislation is unlikely if
the benefits are widespread or if the costs are concentrated.  The
reason for this is what William Eskridge, Jr. calls the “dilemma of
the ungrateful electorate”: the electorate will forget the good
things a legislator does much more rapidly than it will forgive the
legislator for her bad acts.49  A legislator may try to avoid the
dilemma by taking positions that do not injure any of her constit-
42 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 26, at 12.
43 Id.  at 22.
44 See  Eskridge, supra note 41, at 288.
45 See  Blumm, supra note 26, at 415-16; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice , 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 879-80 (1987).
46 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 26, at 19.
47 Id.  at 23.
48 See id.
49 Eskridge, supra  note 41, at 288.
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uents.  However, she finds herself in a precarious position when
legislation will benefit one segment of her constituency and in-
jure another segment.  If she takes a firm position on the issue,
she will disappoint one of the groups.
To satisfy two groups with adverse interests, legislators may,
where possible, attempt to reach a compromise that upsets
neither group.50  If a compromise is not possible, legislators may
draft legislation that establishes noble policy objectives, but is
written with the knowledge that the responsible agency is un-
likely to rigorously enforce it.51  The noble policy objectives sat-
isfy the proponents of the legislation and the lax enforcement
satisfies its opponents.
Legislators may also create vague and ambiguous objectives in
the statute and effectively delegate resolution of the problem to
an administrative agency.52  Due to the vague provisions in the
legislation, both sides can claim victory and the legislator can dis-
tance herself from any negative consequences that result from
the agency’s ultimate resolution of the issue.53  However, when
the beneficiaries of a piece of legislation are only weakly inter-
ested, and its opponents have a strong interest in its defeat, a
legislator has little to gain by voting to enact the legislation.
When a legislator stands to lose a lot by injuring a group that has
a strong interest in the legislation, she has little incentive to enact
the legislation.54  In the absence of legislative action, resolution
of the issue will fall to an administrative agency.
Public choice theory can also be employed to explain the deci-
sions of administrative agencies.  In its pure form, public choice
theory is based on the premise that political actors will act to
secure their re-election.  However, because officers of adminis-
trative agencies are not up for re-election, to effectively apply
public choice theory to administrative agencies it is necessary to
identify an alternative principle that motivates the agencies.  For
administrative agencies, public choice theorists identify an alter-
50 Id.
51 Michael Lyons, Political Self-Interest and U.S. Environmental Policy , 39 NAT.
RES. J. 271, 287-88 (1999).
52 See  Eskridge, supra  note 41, at 288.
53 Id. ; see also  Lyons, supra  note 51, at 288 n.86 (“Congress may deliberately es-
tablish infeasible policy objectives and otherwise write laws that are intrinsically im-
possible to implement so that the bureaucracy will become a scapegoat for the
failures of government.”).
54 Eskridge, supra  note 41, at 288-89.
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nate motivating principle.  William Niskanen, Jr. has articulated
an economic theory that attempts to explain what motivates ad-
ministrative agencies.  According to Niskanen, an administrative
agency is a rational entity that will seek to maximize its budget.55
Substituting Niskanen’s budget-maximizing theory for the legis-
lators’ desire to be re-elected allows public choice theory to be
effectively applied to administrative agencies.
To justify its existence and maximize its budget, an agency will
attempt to demonstrate that it has produced useful services that
warrant continued or increased funding.  Public choice theory
predicts that an agency will be more likely to provide benefits
and services to small, well-organized groups than to diffuse large
groups.  If an agency confers benefits broadly, the benefit each
individual receives will be modest or insignificant.  As a result,
the beneficiaries are unlikely to strongly support the agency, and
therefore legislators will have few incentives to sustain or in-
crease the agency’s budget.  On the other hand, when an agency
confers benefits on or reduces costs borne by a small, economi-
cally motivated group, the members of the group are likely to
actively support the continued existence and expansion of the
agency.56
Additionally, the influence of a small, economically motivated
group on an administrative agency is likely to be greater than its
influence on the legislature because of the increased information
costs associated with administrative rulemaking.  Administrative
rulemaking is a more obscure and technical proceeding than leg-
islating.  As a result, those interested in influencing the proceed-
ing must spend more time and energy to acquire and analyze the
information relevant to the rulemaking process.  A small, eco-
55 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 38-42 (1971) (“Bureaucrats maximize the total budget of their bureau during
their tenure, subject to the constraint that the budget must be equal to or greater
than the minimum total costs of supplying the output expected by the bureau’s
sponsor.”).
56 Budget maximizing does not necessarily mean acting to grow the agency’s
budget.  In the case of a regulatory agency, the regulated entities are unlikely to
favor much growth in the agency since a larger agency may have a greater ability to
oversee and regulate.  However, if an agency is too rigorous in its oversight and
regulation, the regulated entities may use their political power in the legislature to
reduce the agency’s financial support. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III
386-88 (2003).  Therefore, pleasing powerful interest groups may be a self-preserva-
tion strategy (i.e., maximizing the agency’s budget may mean simply preventing sig-
nificant decreases).
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nomically motivated group that stands to receive concrete bene-
fits, or avoid concrete costs as a result of the rulemaking, has a
strong incentive to bear the increased costs of participating in
administrative proceedings.57  In contrast, a large group seeking
diffuse benefits has fewer incentives to bear the costs required to
participate effectively in the rulemaking process.
Bruce Babbitt’s efforts to reform federal grazing practices pro-
vide an excellent context for examining the predictions of public
choice theory.  Concentrated in a handful of western states and
represented by powerful national groups,58 public-lands ranchers
are a small, well-organized group.  Moreover, grazing reform
may impose concrete costs on public-lands ranchers.  The most
dramatic example is the grazing fee assessed by the BLM.  The
undifferentiated public would benefit financially from an in-
crease in the fee.  However, the fiscal benefit would be so small it
would be unnoticeable.59  Similarly, any environmental benefit
that may result from an increased grazing fee would only be evi-
dent on remote, rural western landscapes, far from most Ameri-
cans.  In contrast, the cost to an individual rancher could be
significant if he were forced to pay market value for the forage
his livestock consume.  Although the effects of changes to graz-
ing regulations are more subtle, most attempts to reform grazing
practices will, at least in the short term, impose a burden on pub-
lic-land ranchers.  As a result, public choice theory predicts that
public-land ranchers will organize and be very effective at ob-
structing attempts to reform grazing practices on BLM land.
II
BRUCE BABBITT ATTEMPTS TO REFORM
PUBLIC-LAND GRAZING
Bruce Babbitt is a man of apparent contradictions.  On one
hand, he has close ties to ranching.  He grew up in a ranching
57 Eskridge, supra  note 41, at 289 (arguing that when legislation imposes concen-
trated costs on a small, well-organized group, the group “will tend, over time, to
organize themselves effectively to influence the agency”).
58 These groups include the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cat-
tlemen’s Beef Association, and the Public Lands Council.
59 Not only would the gain to an individual citizen be small, but the gain would
appear in the federal treasury.  It is highly unlikely that an increased grazing fee
would have any detectable financial impact on an individual taxpayer.  Had the cost
per AUM on federal lands been equal to that of private lands, an additional
$243,540 would have been raised. See supra notes 17, 24.
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family in northern Arizona.60  His grandfather homesteaded the
family ranch in 1886.61  Prior to his confirmation as Secretary of
the Interior, he owned a share of his family’s 400,000 acre
ranch.62
Despite his ranching heritage, Babbitt has been an outspoken
advocate for environmental causes.  Before his nomination, Bab-
bitt served as the president of the League of Conservation Voters
(LCV), a conservation organization that examines the environ-
mental friendliness of senators and representatives.63  By his own
admission, Babbitt made strong statements while advocating for
the LCV.64  He has also publicly advocated for the end of “multi-
ple use,”65 a principle that has been heavily relied upon to justify
extractive uses of public land.66
Despite the apparent irreconcilable conflict between grazing
and environmental protection, Babbitt managed to find a middle
ground, avoiding both extremes.  In his conception of dominant
public use, domestic livestock would not be removed from the
60 Bruce Babbitt, Remarks to the Society of Range Management , 29 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 399, 399 (1994).
61 Id.  at 399-400.
62 Associated Press, Babbitt Role in Waste Dispute Questioned, Environmentalists
Claim Conflict of Interest for Cabinet Appointee , BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 5, 1993, at
A5.  Due to the potential conflict between his role as the top governmental official
responsible for managing public lands and his role as a part-owner of a ranch, Bab-
bitt divested himself of his interest in the ranch. Bruce Babbitt Nomination: Hear-
ings on the Proposed Nomination of Bruce Babbitt to BE Secretary of the Interior
Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources , 103d Cong. 36-37 (1993)
[hereinafter Babbitt Nomination Hearings] (prepared statement of Gov. Bruce Bab-
bitt, Secretary of the Interior nominee).
63 League of Conservation Voters, About LCV, http://www.lcv.org/about-lcv/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2006) (The LCV calls itself the “political voice for the environment”
and pledges its support for “leaders who stand up for a clean, healthy future for
America.”).
64 Babbitt Nomination Hearings , supra  note 62, at 34 (statement of Bruce Bab-
bitt) (“[M]y advocacy for [the LCV], whose broad goals I concur with, led me to
make some strong and vigorous advocacy statements.”).
65 Tom Kenworthy, Pragmatic Critic Is Set to Be Interior’s Next Landlord , WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 1993, at A9 (Babbitt once wrote that the “next step in the evolution of
public land use policy is to replace multiple use management with a new concept—
dominant public use—that gives priority to recreation, wildlife and watershed
uses.”); see also  Judy Fahys, If Bruce Babbitt Gets Interior . . . Western Land Users
Detect Cold Winds of Change , SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 13, 1992, at A1 (noting Bab-
bitt’s declaration that multiple-use management has largely been a failure).
66 See Blumm, supra  note 26, at 406-07.
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landscape but rather would be managed to minimize their detri-
mental impact on federal rangeland.67
Although grazing did not figure prominently in Governor Bill
Clinton’s campaign,68 western ranchers saw his running mate,
Senator Al Gore, as an enemy and a threat to their way of life.69
However, Clinton demonstrated support for grazing reform by
nominating Babbitt to serve as his Secretary of the Interior.70  As
Secretary of the Interior, Babbitt would oversee more than 503
million acres of federal land,71 including more than 159 million
acres of rangeland in the western United States.72
A. Babbitt as a Centrist
After his nomination, Babbitt faced confirmation hearings
before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Although his nomination was never truly in jeopardy,73 the con-
servative western senators on the committee expressed concern
over some of Babbitt’s public statements.74
Babbitt’s fundamentally centrist approach to public-land man-
agement became evident later in the hearing when, in response
67 See A Question-and-Answer Session with Interior Secretary Bruce E. Babbitt , 25
NAT’L J. 2714, 2714 (1993) [hereinafter Babbitt Q&A].
68 See  Jane Ann Morrison, Campaign Trails Cross Nevada , LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Oct. 18, 1992, at 1A (When asked whether he supported a grazing-fee increase, Clin-
ton replied, “[i]f elected, I will confer with all interested parties before making a
decision on this issue.”).
69 See  Associated Press, Farm Official Fears Clinton , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 8,
1992, at 13E (president of the Nevada Farm Bureau Federation expressing her fear
that Gore represents a threat to grazing on public land); Bill Mintz & William E.
Clayton, Many in Oil and Gas Industries Pessimistic Despite Assurances , HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 18, 1992, at B10 (Senator Alan Simpson commenting on the devastat-
ing impact Gore’s policies would have on Wyoming’s extractive industries).
70 It was widely known that Babbitt was critical of the Interior Department’s ex-
isting management of the public range. See, e.g. , Gregg Easterbrook, Bruce Bab-
bitt’s Interior Motives , NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at 25, 25 (quoting Babbitt as
saying that “[f]or 12 years Interior has been the center of the Washington anti-envi-
ronmental movement”).
71 James Conaway, Babbitt in the Woods: The Clinton Environmental Revolution
That Wasn’t , HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1993, at 52, 52.
72 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 1, at 3-5 tbl.3-2.
73 Following the opening statements of the senators, Senator Malcolm Wallop, a
conservative Republican from Wyoming known for his fierce loyalty to ranchers,
stated that he had no doubts that Babbitt would be confirmed. Babbitt Nomination
Hearings , supra  note 62, at 37.
74 In his opening remarks, Senator Wallop expressed concern about a lecture in
which Babbitt told ranchers to prepare for the end of grazing on public land. Id.  at
4.  Similarly, Senator Frank Murkowski expressed concern about Babbitt’s call for
the end of multiple use. See id.  at 16.
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to a question from Utah Senator Robert Bennett, he assured the
committee that he believed, “there is an important place for
ranching, regardless of how much . . . we may quarrel on the
margins . . . .”75  Reassured by Babbitt’s moderate approach to
public-land management, the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources unanimously voted to approve his confirma-
tion as the Secretary of the Interior.76  The Senate confirmed
Babbitt as Secretary of the Interior on January 21, 1993.77
B. Jim Baca’s More Radical View
The BLM is responsible for the majority of federally managed
rangeland.78  Although grazing occurs on land managed by the
Forest Service79 and the Fish and Wildlife Service,80 grazing is
most commonly associated with the BLM.81  Because of the im-
portant role that the BLM plays in public-rangeland administra-
tion, Babbitt’s choice for Director of the BLM would send a
strong message to ranchers and environmentalists.  On February
23, 1993, the White House nominated Jim Baca to serve as direc-
tor of the BLM.82  Many ranchers were critical of Babbitt’s
choice and feared it was a sign of the end of public-land graz-
ing.83  Before his appointment, Baca served on The Wilderness
75 Id.  at 78.  Babbitt also took the opportunity to reemphasize his familial connec-
tion to ranching.  He completed his answer by asserting that, as Secretary, he in-
tended to “do [his] very best to reconcile the conflicts and to keep that industry on
the land for the good of the West.” Id.
76 Tony Batt, O’Leary to Lead Energy; Babbitt, Interior , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan.
22, 1993, at 3A.
77 Id.
78 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO/RCED-88-80, RANGELAND
MANAGEMENT: MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED
GRAZING ALLOTMENTS 10 (1988), available at  http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat17/
136027.pdf.
79 Id.
80 ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 99, 163 (2003).
81 The BLM’s history has been strongly influenced by grazing.  In 1946, the BLM
was formed by the merger of the Grazing Service with the General Land Office.
PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS 84-85 (1960).
82 Timothy Egan, Big Changes Ahead for West; Public Resource Plan Alters Man-
agement of 500 Million Acres , SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24, 1993, at A7.
83 See, e.g., id. ; Associated Press, Nevada Ranchers Worry About Babbitt’s Ap-
pointees , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 26, 1993, at 6B (quoting an executive board
member of the Nevada Cattlemen’s Association, “I was quite surprised that Babbitt
picked someone who was that far into the environmental movement.”); Maura Do-
lan, Environmental Activists Adapt to Insider Role , L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A1.
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Society’s governing board.84  Perhaps more troubling to ranchers
than his close ties to an environmental organization was a signifi-
cant increase in state grazing fees that occurred during Baca’s
term as New Mexico’s land commissioner.85
C. The Birth of Rangeland Reform
The federal regulations governing grazing on federal land had
not been significantly amended since shortly after the enactment
of FLPMA in 1976.86  Yet within six months of Baca’s nomina-
tion as BLM director, Secretary Babbitt and Baca had published
a pragmatic proposal to reform grazing on public lands.  The re-
form effort, titled “Rangeland Reform ‘94,” stated three reasons
for the proposed changes: (1) to improve administration of the
BLM grazing program, (2) to restore and improve the ecological
condition of the rangeland, and (3) to establish a “fair and equi-
table grazing fee.”87
D. The Vision of Rangeland Reform ‘94
Babbitt was fundamentally a moderate on grazing.  Although
environmental advocates have argued for the elimination of graz-
ing on at least some of the land managed by the BLM,88 Babbitt
84 Associated Press, supra  note 83.  For additional information about The Wilder-
ness Society, see The Wilderness Society, About The Wilderness Society, http://
www.wilderness.org/AboutUs (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
85 The grazing fee on state lands increased from $1.60 to $3.30 per AUM during
Baca’s tenure. Baca, Possible BLM Boss, Has Rich Grazing Policy History , PUB.
LANDS NEWS, Feb. 18, 1993, at 5, 5.
86 See  Alteration of Grazing Regulations to Allow for Management Flexibility to
Achieve Multiple Use, Sustained Yield, Environmental, Economic, and Other
Objectives, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,058, 29,062 (July 5, 1978) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts.
4100-4300).  The 1978 rulemaking effort actually began before Congress enacted
FLPMA. See  Modernization of Regulations for Administering Grazing on Public
Lands, Exclusive of Alaska, to Meet Present-Day Needs, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,504, 31,504
(proposed July 28, 1976) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4100-4300.  The intent of
the initial rulemaking was to modernize existing rules that had become outdated.
Id.  After the passage of FLPMA on October 21, 1976, the BLM broadened its pro-
posed rulemaking to include provisions required by FLPMA.  Modernization of
Livestock Grazing Regulations for Public Lands and Addition of Provisions to Com-
ply With the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 42 Fed. Reg. 35,334,
35,334 (proposed July 8, 1977) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4100, 4700, 9230).
87 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RANGELAND RE-
FORM ’94 3 (1993).
88 See, e.g. , Feller, supra  note 16, at 572-73 (criticizing the BLM for its failure to
use its FLPMA authority to exclude grazing “where its routine impacts—trampling,
soil erosion, watershed deterioration, water pollution, scenic degradation, competi-
tion with wildlife—or the costs of grazing administration, may exceed its economic
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never espoused such a position.89  His proposed reforms re-
flected his centrism; Rangeland Reform ‘94 was hardly a radical
proposal.  Instead, it was fundamentally a common-sense ap-
proach to addressing the dismal state of federal rangelands.90
Rangeland Reform ‘94 consisted of three separate reform ef-
forts that reflected the purpose and need for the proposal.91  The
first reform was a package of amendments to the regulations and
policies that govern grazing on federal land.92  The second was a
proposal to add national standards and guidelines to the regula-
tions in order to establish minimum acceptable ecological condi-
tions for federal rangeland.93  The third reform proposed to bring
federal grazing fees closer to the fee charged for forage on pri-
vate land.94
1. Reforming Rangeland Regulations and Policy
Babbitt and Baca presented Rangeland Reform ‘94 as the next
step in the evolution of rangeland reform that began with the
passage of the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act.95  The core of Range-
land Reform ‘94 was an effort to modernize federal grazing man-
agement.96  To this end, they proposed a package of fourteen
additions and amendments to the grazing regulations.97
benefits”); PUB. EMPLOYEES FOR ENVTL. RESPONSIBILITY, PUBLIC TRUST BE-
TRAYED: EMPLOYEE CRITIQUE OF BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT RANGELAND
MANAGEMENT 7-8 (1993) (lamenting BLM’s failure to appreciate “that a tremen-
dous amount of public land is unsuitable for livestock grazing”).
89 See, e.g. , Babbitt Nomination Hearings , supra  note 62, at 78.
90 See  Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a) (2006)
(congressional finding that “vast segments of the public rangelands . . . are in an
unsatisfactory condition”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra  note 78, at 22 &
tbl.2.1 (noting 1986 BLM report which indicates that nearly 60% of grazing allot-
ments are in “fair” or “poor” condition).
91 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 3 (reform proposal addresses
three concerns and needs).
92 Id.  at 9.
93 Id.  at 17.
94 Id.  at 26.
95 Id.  at 1-2.
96 See id.  at 2 (acknowledging that much has changed since the enactment of the
TGA).
97 Id.  at 9-16.  The fourteen regulatory changes proposed by Babbitt and Baca
were: (1) imposition of a surcharge on subleasing agreements, (2) development of a
“procedure for resolving small unauthorized use incidents at the local level,” (3)
expansion of opportunities for public participation in rangeland management, (4)
creation of conservation use permits and addition of a requirement to apply for tem-
porary non-use annually, (5) elimination of suspended AUMs when permits are re-
newed, (6) consideration of the permittee’s past performance during allocation of
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2. Establishing National Standards and Guidelines
The establishment of national standards and guidelines, argua-
bly the most ambitious reform proposed by Babbitt in Rangeland
Reform ‘94, would ensure that grazing did not interfere with
properly functioning ecosystems.98  Although the proposal did
not mention Babbitt’s conception of “dominant public use,”99 the
discussion that immediately preceded the national standards and
guidelines clearly reflected the influence of his vision for a “new
land ethic.”100
The national standards and guidelines proposed by Babbitt
were ambitious, particularly in contrast to the BLM’s customary
management of federal rangeland.  The BLM manages range-
lands pursuant to the directives in the TGA, FLPMA, and PRIA.
Although these statutes reduce the adverse effects of grazing on
federal rangeland,101 they contain only vague requirements to
protect rangeland ecosystems.102  As a result, the BLM has rarely
considered the effect of grazing on rangeland ecosystems.  In
additional forage that becomes available, (7) creation of an exemption from the ap-
peals process for certain administrative actions, (8) addition of a provision that
would prohibit ranchers from holding a BLM grazing permit if a previously held
permit had been cancelled, (9) addition of a provision that would allow the BLM to
cancel the grazing permit of a permittee who had been convicted of violating envi-
ronmental laws or regulations, (10) addition of a provision for the issuance of per-
mits for a period less than ten years, (11) establishment of Resource Advisory
Councils, (12) addition of a provision that would provide more flexibility in the use
of Range Improvement Funds, (13) a requirement that title to all future range im-
provements vest in the federal government, and (14) a requirement that title to
water rights on federal lands vest in the federal government.
98 See id.  at 17.
99 See supra  text accompanying note 67.
100 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 17 (“In those cases where
livestock grazing is detrimental to the health of the ecosystem, grazing must be mod-
ified or eliminated.  The adjustments called for are in the best interest of ecological
sustainability, biodiversity, and society as a whole, which ultimately is in the best
interest of the livestock industry.”).
101 See  Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, 1269 (1934) (officially titled:
“An Act [t]o stop injury to the public grazing lands . . . .”); Public Rangeland Im-
provement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803, 1803 (officially titled: “An
Act [t]o improve the range conditions of the public rangelands.”).
102 See  43 U.S.C. § 315a (2006) (“The Secretary of the Interior . . . shall . . . do any
and all things necessary . . . to preserve the land and its resources from destruction
or unnecessary injury . . . .”); id.  § 1908(a) (granting the Secretary the authority to
develop an experimental program that would provide ranchers with incentives to
improve the conditions of the range); id.  § 1732(b) (“In managing the public lands,
the Secretary shall, subject to this Act and other applicable law and under such
terms and conditions as are consistent with such law, regulate, through . . . permits,
. . . the use, occupancy, and development of the public lands . . . .”).
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contrast, Babbitt’s proposed standards and guidelines would re-
quire the BLM to consider a broad array of environmental im-
pacts in its administration of the public rangeland.103
3. Grazing Fees
The proposal to increase the cost of grazing federal land was
unquestionably the most controversial element of the reforms
proposed in Rangeland Reform ‘94.  Despite its controversial na-
ture, there was widespread agreement that an increase in the
grazing fee was necessary.104  The fee formula proposed in
Rangeland Reform ‘94 attempted to establish a fee structure that
would result, over the course of three years, in a fee that more
closely represented the fair market value of the forage on federal
land.  The proposed fee structure, had it been in effect in 1993,
would have resulted in a grazing fee of $4.28 per AUM,105 rather
than the $1.86 per AUM actually charged by the BLM.106
III
THE EROSION OF RANGELAND REFORM ‘94
Despite the centrist approach of the proposal, ranching inter-
ests responded strongly and negatively to the proposed re-
forms.107  The proposed grazing fee increase drew especially
harsh criticism.108  An aide to Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse
103 The national standards and guidelines would require grazing to be managed in
a manner that, for example, “ensure[s] the recovery of threatened or endangered
species, . . . maintain[s] or restore[s] water quality . . . that meet[s] or exceed[s] State
standards for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, . . . [and]
. . . maintain[s] or restore[s] vegetation communities.” BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
supra note 87, at 19.
104 For example, in June 1991, the GAO published a report indicating that the
BLM’s grazing fee formula established by PRIA, and extended by a series of Execu-
tive Orders, resulted in a grazing fee that was not even sufficient to cover the cost of
administering the federal grazing programs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUBL’N NO. GAO/RCED-91-185BR, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT
FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES LOW 31 (1991), available at  http://archive.gao.gov/
d20t9/144191.pdf.
105 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 87, at 30.
106 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MAINTAINING
BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 74 (1999), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/12xx/doc1222/wholereport.pdf.
107 Babbitt’s efforts to reform rangeland management ignited a small “Fire Bab-
bitt!” movement in the West. See, e.g.,  Valerie Richardson, Babbitt’s ‘Green’ Poli-
cies Provoke Anger in West , WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at A1.
108 Despite the ranchers’ outrage, Babbitt’s proposed fee increase was not a radi-
cal idea.  Even the BLM director in the George H.W. Bush administration had advo-
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Campbell stated that the proposed fee increase was absolutely
unacceptable.109  Similarly, the Rocky Mountain News  published
an editorial claiming that the fee increase was not about protect-
ing the environment or ensuring that the public receives a fair
return for its resources, but rather it was about pitting the “gov-
ernment class and its monied allies against working people and
small communities.”110  Randall Brewer, then-president of the
Public Lands Council, predicted that the proposed fee increase
would “be the end of grazing on federal land.”111
Brewer also criticized Babbitt’s proposal to create national
standards and guidelines.  In Brewer’s view, Babbitt’s standards
and guidelines “hold great potential for mischief as either a safe
harbor for poor performance by federal land managers or as a
club in the hands of an overly zealous land manager.”112
A. Congressional Battles over Rangeland Reform ‘94
On October 7, 1993, Babbitt and congressional Democrats
reached a compromise that promised to legislatively enact most
of the reforms in Rangeland Reform ‘94.113  The proposal, added
as an amendment to the 1994 appropriations bill, would reduce
Babbitt’s proposed grazing-fee by about seventy-five cents per
AUM and implement approximately two-thirds of the regulatory
reforms proposed in Rangeland Reform ‘94.114  The House easily
cated for a fee increase. See  Associated Press, Bureau Chief Seeks Change in
Grazing Fees , OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 30, 1992, at 22.
109 Babbitt Seeks Tough New Range Standards, Higher Fees , PUB. LANDS NEWS,
Aug. 19, 1993, at 1, 2.  Senator Campbell was so concerned with Babbitt’s fee in-
crease, he introduced legislation in the Senate that would result in a much smaller
increase and cap future increases two weeks before Babbitt released his proposal.
See DOI Range Policy May Change More Than Fees; House Prepares , PUB. LANDS
NEWS, Aug. 5, 1993, at 2, 3 (Campbell’s proposal would have resulted in a grazing
fee of $2.36 per AUM in 1994); see generally  Federal Forage Fee Act of 1993, S.
1326, 103rd Cong (1993).
110 Philip Burgess, Editorial, Babbitt’s Beef Is With a Way of Life , ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS (Denver), Aug. 17, 1993, at 35A.
111 House Dems Back Off Range Bill; Ranchers Hit DOI Plan , PUB. LANDS NEWS,
Sept. 16, 1993, at 3, 4.
112 Id.
113 Babbitt, Hill Dems Agree on Grazing Fees, Range Policy , PUB. LANDS NEWS,
Oct. 14, 1993, at 1, 1.
114 Id.  Under the agreement between Babbitt and congressional Democrats, Bab-
bitt would be left to develop national standards and guidelines without congressional
guidance or interference. Id.  at 1-2.
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passed the appropriations bill with Babbitt’s reforms attached.115
However, the bill encountered substantial difficulty in the Sen-
ate.  Western senators successfully filibustered and prevented the
Senate from considering the range reforms attached to the ap-
propriations bill.116  On November 9, 1993, the western senators
ultimately triumphed and successfully removed the range reform
provisions from the bill.117  Although Babbitt believed that legis-
lation was a more complete solution to the problems of range-
land management, he vowed that if and when legislative efforts
failed, he would pursue regulatory changes.118  With the death of
the legislative attempts to reform rangeland management, Idaho
Senator Larry Craig declared victory for the West,119 and the
task of reform fell back into Babbitt’s hands.
B. The Beginning of the End for Rangeland Reform
The proposal detailed in Rangeland Reform ‘94 was the apo-
gee of Babbitt’s attempt to reform rangeland management.  The
defeat of Babbitt’s legislative attempt to reform rangeland man-
agement marked the beginning of the end for grazing reform.
1. Babbitt Attempts Compromise to Salvage Reform Effort
During the heat of the battle to pass his reforms through the
Senate, Babbitt promised that if the legislative effort failed, he
would proceed with his administrative efforts to reform grazing,
including his proposed fee hike.120  His stance softened soon af-
ter his reform package was defeated in the Senate.  Perhaps mo-
tivated by political pressure brought to bear on President
Clinton,121 he vowed to make considerable changes to his propo-
115 Senate Refuses to Consider Range Policy Changes—Thus Far , supra note 33, at
1.
116 Id.
117 Westerners Defeat Babbitt Range Policy—Or Do They? , supra note 27, at 3.
118 Filibuster Still Has Range Policy Trapped; One More Try , PUB. LANDS NEWS,
Nov. 11, 1993, at 4, 4.
119 Westerners Defeat Babbitt Range Policy—Or Do They? , supra note 27, at 3;
Associated Press, Ecological Goals Still Elusive Acknowledging Failures, Babbitt
Calls Struggling Talks ‘Work in Progress ,’ ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec.
26, 1993, at 88A (According to Senator Craig, “[t]hey had to be stopped cold in their
tracks.”).
120 Filibuster Still Has Range Policy Trapped; One More Try , supra  note 118, at 4.
121 Valerie Richardson, Clinton Warned to Soften up on Riled West , WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1993, at A1.
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sal before publishing proposed regulations,122 and he backed off
of his threat to enact the grazing fee administratively.123
As further evidence of his desire to reach a compromise, Bab-
bitt announced he would spend the winter traveling to Colorado
to discuss the proposed reforms with ranchers and environmen-
talists.124  Throughout the winter, Babbitt publicly emphasized
the importance of compromise125 and of giving all interested par-
ties a voice in the decision.126
2. Baca Put Out to Pasture
Babbitt provided further evidence of the erosion of his reform
efforts when, on February 3, 1994, he forced Jim Baca to re-
sign.127  Publicly, Babbitt asserted that Baca’s resignation should
not be construed as a reflection of the administration’s grazing
policy.128  Instead he insisted that Baca’s resignation was a result
of conflicting management styles.129  Babbitt’s protestations to
the contrary notwithstanding, the reaction of the stakeholders in
the ranching debate to Baca’s resignation and public statements
by Baca after his resignation suggest that something more than
management styles was involved.
From the outset Baca was not welcomed by the ranching com-
munity.  Ranchers saw Baca as an environmental advocate and a
threat to their way of life.130  Therefore, ranchers saw his resigna-
tion as a victory.  Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop, a staunch
supporter of public-lands ranching, saw Baca’s resignation as a
direct consequence of the Senate’s defeat of Babbitt’s rangeland
122 Associated Press, supra note 119; Ellen Miller, Ranchers Spring a Surprise ,
DENVER POST, Dec. 10, 1993, at B1.  While Babbitt promised substantial changes, he
also promised that the proposed regulations would remain true to the vision of
Rangeland Reform ’94. Babbitt Said Interested in Gunnison Range Plan, to a De-
gree , PUB. LANDS NEWS, Dec. 9, 1993, at 2, 2-3.
123 Richardson, supra  note 121.
124 Mark Obmascik, Babbitt Discovers New Middle Ground on Ranching Policy ,
DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 1993, at B1; Westerners Defeat Babbitt Range Policy—Or Do
They? , supra note 117, at 3.
125 Compromises Spurring Rangeland Reforms , COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELE-
GRAPH, Dec. 28, 1993, at B5.
126 Babbitt Says Modified Plan Allows for Some Local Flexibility , OREGONIAN
(Portland), Dec. 17, 1993, at C9.
127 Tom Kenworthy, Interior Dept. Official Resigns Under Pressure , WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 1994, at A17.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See supra  notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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proposal.131  Similarly, upon learning of Baca’s resignation, a
representative of a New Mexican grazing organization declared,
“One down and 100 to go.”132
The reaction of the environmental community gave further
support to the proposition that Baca’s resignation reflected the
administration’s softening of its position on grazing.  The presi-
dent of The Wilderness Society saw Baca’s resignation as “a seri-
ous blow to the Clinton administration’s credibility on public
lands reform.”133  Similarly, the vice president of the National
Wildlife Federation expressed concern about the administration’s
commitment to grazing reform.134  The president of the National
Wildlife Federation put Baca’s resignation in starker terms and
declared it a “major retreat” by the administration.135
Following his resignation, Baca made several statements that
belied Babbitt’s claim that his resignation was due to conflicting
management styles.  Baca believed that political pressure from
western politicians was behind his removal.136  For example,
Cecil Andrus, the governor of Idaho and Secretary of the Inte-
rior in the Carter administration, had made his displeasure with
Baca well-known to the Clinton administration.137  The political
pressure exerted by western politicians was due, in part, to
Baca’s unwillingness to compromise or grant exception for spe-
cial interests.138
Further, Babbitt’s own behavior suggests that Babbitt simply
wanted Baca removed from the politically fractious grazing de-
bate.  Before he asked for Baca’s resignation, Babbitt offered
him a position as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Interior De-
partment.139  If Babbitt had genuine concerns about conflicting
management styles, offering Baca another prominent position in
the Department was a puzzling attempt at resolution.
131 Kenworthy, supra note 127.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Mary Beth Regan, Rough Ride for an Ex-Cowboy , BUS. WK., Feb. 28, 1994, at
70, 72.
135 Kenworthy, supra note 127.
136 Id.  (“Frankly, this came about because those western elected officials are wor-
ried about fund-raising from those traditional extractive industries,” Baca claimed.).
137 Regan, supra  note 134, at 72.
138 Id.
139 Kenworthy, supra note 127.
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C. Proposed Regulations
Before the proposed grazing regulations were released, Bab-
bitt continued his efforts to build credibility with the ranching
community.  Speaking before the Society of Range Manage-
ment,140 Babbitt emphasized his personal connections to ranch-
ing and stated that his reform efforts were an attempt to find
common ground among westerners.141
Despite the predictions that the Clinton administration would
cave on grazing regulations, the proposed regulations, issued on
March 25, 1994,142 remained faithful to the vision of Rangeland
Reform ‘94.143  But the proposed regulations clearly bore the
scars of Babbitt’s battles throughout the previous fall.  Two of the
most controversial provisions of the original proposal, increasing
the grazing fee and developing national standards and guidelines,
were significantly diluted.  But two other controversial reforms,
vesting title to range improvements in the federal government
and requiring water rights to be federally owned, remained
intact.
1. Softening the Grazing Fee
The most notable retreat from the reforms proposed in Range-
land Reform ‘94 was the modification of the proposed grazing
fee increase.  Since the first fee for grazing on BLM land was
imposed in 1934,144 the amount of the fee has been a substantial
source of controversy.145  However, Babbitt was not alone in his
belief that the grazing fee needed to be increased.  The George
H.W. Bush administration had been considering changes to the
grazing fee before Clinton was elected.146
140 The Society for Range Management is an organization “concerned with study-
ing, conserving, managing and sustaining the varied resources of the rangeland.”
Society for Range Management, About SRM, http://www.rangelands.org/about_srm.
shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
141 Babbitt, supra  note 60, at 399-400.
142 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg.
14,314, 14,314 (proposed Mar. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780,
4100).
143 See  Feller, supra  note 31, at 710-12.
144 See  Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, § 3, 48 Stat. 1269, 1270 (1934).
145 See S. REP. NO. 95-1237, at 6 (1978), as reprinted in  1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4069,
4070 (noting the ongoing debate over grazing fees); Administration of Livestock
Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg. at 14,335 (noting controversy over graz-
ing fee formula created by PRIA).
146 See  Associated Press, supra  note 108.
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Despite the apparent fairness of Babbitt’s initial fee in-
crease,147 he made two concessions on the grazing fee.  His first
concession was minor.  To ease the concerns of the ranching com-
munity, he delayed implementation of the fee increase until the
1995 grazing season and established 1996 as the base year for
determining future increases.148  His second concession was more
significant.  The proposed rule modified the fee structure by al-
lowing ranchers who participate in rangeland improvement pro-
grams to receive a 30% discount on their grazing fees.149
Although the criteria for receiving the incentive-based reduction
was left for future rulemaking, Babbitt anticipated that the crite-
ria would require the permittee to undertake actions to improve
the “ecological health of the public rangelands” beyond those re-
quired by law.150  Notably, President George H.W. Bush’s BLM
Director, Cy Jamison, was working on incentive-based grazing
fees when Clinton was elected.151  Although the discounts would
have been deeper under Jamison’s proposal and the criteria to
qualify for the discounts much lower,152 the similarities between
the two plans are significant considering the conservative politi-
cal stance of the George H.W. Bush administration.
2. The Death of National Standards and Guidelines
A key piece of Babbitt’s initial reform proposal was the devel-
opment of national standards and guidelines to govern the man-
agement of grazing activities.  The national standards and
guidelines would define the minimum acceptable conditions for
public rangeland.153
147 The then-existing fee formula, created by Congress in 1978, resulted in a fee
that was substantially below market value and was relatively stagnant over time.
The fee formula proposed in August as part of Rangeland Reform ’94 was an at-
tempt to bring the federal grazing fee closer to the fee charged for forage on private
lands. See  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Regulation of Livestock Grazing
on Federal Rangelands—Exclusive of Alaska, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208, 43,209-10 (Aug.
13, 1993).
148 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg. at
14,336.
149 Id.  at 14,316-17.
150 Id.  at 14,317.
151 Associated Press, supra  note 108.
152 Jamison’s proposal would have allowed ranchers to receive a discount of up to
75%. Id.  Jamison’s lowest discount, 25%, would have been available to ranchers
who met the objectives in their allotment management plans. Id.
153 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 17.
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Despite the relative lack of controversy over the national stan-
dards and guidelines,154 the proposed rule largely eliminated
them.155  In their place, each state BLM office was required to
develop standards and guidelines consistent with national re-
quirements.156  The rationale for the new approach was that na-
tional standards and guidelines could not be developed to apply
across the West.157  However, the national standards and guide-
lines proposed in Rangeland Reform ‘94 were quite broad.158
Although local conditions may require more specific and/or strin-
gent requirements, the proposed standards and guidelines were
sufficiently general to permit national application.
Babbitt’s decision to scuttle the national standards and guide-
lines and implement statewide standards and guidelines was
sharply criticized by environmentalists.159  Remarkably, ranching
interests were also not particularly pleased with the proposal, al-
154 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg.
at 14,315 (noting that the proposed grazing fee increase and the changes to water
rights generated the most comments).
155 A fragment of Babbitt’s original standards and guidelines appeared as a re-
striction on the terms and conditions contained in grazing permits. See id.  at 14,353
(proposed 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1(a)).
156 Id.  at 14,325.
157 See id.
158 The proposed standards sought to ensure recovery of threatened and endan-
gered species, would have included terms and conditions in permits requiring main-
tenance and restoration of water quality, and mandated “period(s) of rest during
times of critical plant growth or regrowth.” BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note
87, at 19.
159 See  Timothy Noah, Babbitt Unveils a New Version of Grazing Plan , WALL ST.
J., Mar. 18, 1994, at A5 (One staff scientist at the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group complained, “[t]he only teeth in the plan are those on the cows.”).  Environ-
mentalists were also concerned about the change in political dynamics that would
result from transferring responsibility for developing standards and guidelines from
Washington, D.C. to the state BLM offices. See  Christopher Smith & Mike Gorrell,
Babbitt Feels Barbed Wire Straddling Grazing-Fee Fence , SALT LAKE TRIB., June 9,
1994, at B3.  The factors giving rise to the disproportionate influence of ranchers
under public choice theory become more pronounced when the debate moves to the
state or local level.  Promulgation of state standards and guidelines has the potential
to impose substantial costs on ranchers grazing in the affected state.  Therefore, each
rancher has a strong incentive to ensure that the standards and guidelines promul-
gated by his state BLM office are as favorable to him as possible.  In contrast, the
broad interests of the beneficiaries of rangeland reform become more diffused.  The
beneficiaries are interested in improvements in rangeland health, but improvements
in Wyoming are equally as valuable as improvements in New Mexico.  Therefore,
the intensity of the beneficiaries’ interests will be spread equally across eleven (or
more, depending on the prevalence of regional standards) separate proceedings.
The end result is that the balance of power is likely to shift to more strongly favor
ranching interests. See generally supra  notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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though a representative of the American Sheep Industry Associ-
ation saw the demise of national standards and guidelines as a
step in the right direction.160
3. Elimination of Suspended Non-Use and Shortened Permit
Tenure
The proposed rule abandoned two other proposals contained
in Rangeland Reform ‘94: eliminating suspended AUMs when
renewing permits and authorizing shortened permit tenure.161  In
both cases, Babbitt dropped the proposals in response to com-
ments received in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.162  Although these two provisions played a less sig-
nificant role in the overall vision of Rangeland Reform ‘94, their
death reflected the steady erosion of Babbitt’s reform efforts.
D. Final Grazing Regulations Promulgated
The Babbitt BLM promulgated final grazing-administration
rules on February 22, 1995.163  With three notable exceptions, the
final rule was largely the same as the proposed rule.  First, the
proposed grazing-fee increase was eliminated from the final ver-
sion.164  Babbitt’s retreat on the grazing fee was a substantial vic-
tory for the ranching community.  The proposed increase in the
grazing fee had met substantial resistance from ranchers and
their senators.165  With the death of Babbitt’s administrative-fee
proposal, proponents of a grazing-fee increase were left to pur-
sue an increase legislatively.166  However, after the congressional
elections in November 1994, reform proponents were faced with
a Republican Congress led by Newt Gingrich and his “Contract
160 Noah, supra  note 159.
161 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg.
at 14,322-23; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Regulation of Live-
stock Grazing on Federal Rangelands—Exclusive of Alaska, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208,
43,212-13 (Aug. 13, 1993); BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 11 (describ-
ing the original proposal regarding suspended AUMs);
162 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg. at
14,322-23.
163 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894,
9894 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
164 Id.  at 9899.
165 See supra  notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
166 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. at
9899 (stating that the BLM had abandoned the proposed grazing fee “in order to
give the Congress the opportunity to . . . enact legislation addressing appropriate
fees for grazing on public lands”).
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for America.”  Ranchers scarcely could have hoped for a more
potent ally in their battle to keep the federal grazing fee low.167
The second significant concession was that, at the request of
Senators Domenici and Craig,168 the BLM delayed the date the
new regulations would take effect by six months.169  The delay
guaranteed that the regulations would not apply to the 1995 graz-
ing season.  As a result, the ranchers had more than a year to
pursue federal legislation that would overturn Babbitt’s
regulations.
The third departure from the proposed rule was the continued
erosion of Babbitt’s proposal for national standards and guide-
lines.  The Fundamentals of Rangeland Health (FRH) made
their appearance in the final rule.170  The proposed rule con-
tained a provision that required the terms and conditions of all
grazing permits to guarantee ecological health.171  The final rule
softened the requirement: instead of demanding permit condi-
tions to guarantee each permittee’s compliance with the FRH,
the final rule required only that the “authorized officer shall take
appropriate action” when ecological conditions are not being
met.172
Although the final rule was substantially less ambitious than
Babbitt’s initial proposal, the rule did make significant changes
to the management of public rangeland.  Although solutions to
the most pernicious problems (e.g., grazing ecologically fragile
landscapes, selling federal forage for a fraction of its market
value) were absent from the final rule, the 1995 regulations were
the first significant reform of federal grazing activities since the
167 Nevada Senator Harry Reid expressed confidence that the new Republican
Congress would not address the federal grazing fee anytime soon.  Tony Batt, Ne-
vada’s Fate Unlikely to Change , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 11, 1994, at 1A.  Inaction
on the grazing fee is a victory for the ranchers.  Inaction means that ranchers can
continue grazing under artificially low fees.  A representative of the National Cattle-
men’s Association went one step further and predicted that the new Republican
Congress would make changes to Babbitt’s regulations. Id.
168 Babbitt Tosses Grazing Fee Hot Potato to Hill; Keeps Rest , PUB. LANDS NEWS,
Jan. 5, 1995, at 2, 2.
169 Id. ; see also  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60
Fed. Reg. at 9894.
170 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. at
9898.
171 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. Reg.
14,314, 14,353 (proposed Mar. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780,
4100) (proposed 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1).
172 See  43 C.F.R. 4180.1 (1995).
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passage of FLPMA in 1976.  The new regulation marked an im-
portant first step in the effort to reduce the detrimental ecologi-
cal consequences of public land ranching.
IV
CHALLENGES TO RANGELAND REFORM ‘94
A. Legislative Efforts to Eliminate Rangeland Reform
Despite Babbitt’s efforts to forge a compromise reform pack-
age from his initial common-sense reform proposal, ranchers and
their congressional representatives sought to reverse the modest
progress Babbitt’s regulations represented.  Shortly after the
publication of the BLM’s final grazing regulations, conservative
western Republicans launched a legislative effort to supersede
Babbitt’s reforms.  On May 25, 1995, Representative Wes Cooley
of Oregon introduced the Livestock Grazing Act, which would
have overturned Babbitt’s reforms regarding water rights and ti-
tle to range improvements.173  Remarkably, the bill also included
a modest grazing fee increase.174  When the bill was introduced in
the House, Cooley strongly criticized Babbitt’s reform effort,
characterizing it as “a direct threat to [w]estern livestock produc-
ers and rural communities through the West . . . a prime compo-
nent of the Clinton Administration’s War on the West.”175
Despite more than a year of maneuvering, the legislative effort to
undermine Babbitt’s reform effort eventually died.
B. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt
When the final regulations were published on February 22,
1995, the BLM announced that the rules would not take effect
until August 21, 1995.176  As the effective date of Babbitt’s regu-
lations approached with no prospect of legislative resolution in
the near term, the Public Lands Council and several grazing or-
ganizations filed suit in the District of Wyoming on July 27,
173 Livestock Grazing Act, H.R. 1713, 104th Cong. §§ 122-123 (1995).
174 If the Livestock Grazing Act had been in effect in 1992, it would have resulted
in a grazing fee of $2.10 per AUM instead of $1.87 per AUM. GOP Range Bill
Would Ease NEPA, Transfer Grasslands from FS , PUB. LANDS NEWS, June 8, 1995,
at 1, 2.
175 Id.
176 See supra  notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
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1995.177  The plaintiffs alleged that ten of Babbitt’s regulations
were unlawful and sought to prevent them from taking effect.178
1. Procedural Chronology of the Public Lands Council’s
Challenge
Before the Wyoming District Court, the Public Lands Council
challenged ten provisions of Babbitt’s regulations: (1) the modifi-
cation of the grazing preference,179 (2) the addition of a regula-
tion that would consider the past performance of a permit
applicant’s affiliate,180 (3) vesting title to range improvements in
the federal government,181 (4) conservation use permits,182 (5)
limits on temporary non-use,183 (6) elimination of the require-
ment that permittees be engaged “in the livestock business,”184
(7) denial of exclusive use of water-related range improve-
ments,185 (8) addition of conditions under which grazing permits
will be suspended or cancelled,186 (9) addition of surcharges for
pasturing agreements,187 and (10) the Fundamentals of Range-
land Health.188  In the District Court of Wyoming,189 Judge Brim-
177 See Ranchers Sue Government over Rules for Grazing , supra  note 35.
178 See  Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) [here-
inafter Pub. Lands Council II].
179 Babbitt’s final regulations altered the regulatory definition of “grazing prefer-
ence.” Compare  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995) with  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994).
180 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b)(1) (1995).  For a definition of “affiliate,” see 43 C.F.R.
§ 4100.0-5 (1995).
181 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(b) (1995).
182 The 1995 regulations altered the definition of “active use” to include “conser-
vation use.” Compare  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1996) with  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994).
This change had the effect of allowing a permittee to receive a permit to conserve
forage. See  Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1443 (D. Wyo. 1996).
183 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g) (1995).
184 Compare  43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1995) with  43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1994).
185 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(d) (1995).
186 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(c) (1995).
187 43 C.F.R. § 4130.8-1(d) (1995).
188 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995).
189 The Public Lands Council’s decision to file its case in the District of Wyoming
is significant.  Wyoming is perhaps the most ranching-friendly state in the nation.
Wyoming has the fifth-highest number of federal grazing permittees. BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., supra  note 1, at 3-65 tbl.3-17.  Because Wyoming has a large number
of federal grazing permittees and a relatively small population, it has the highest
number of federal ranch permit holders per capita in the nation. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000: RANKING TABLES FOR STATES:
1990 & 2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/ phc-t2/
tab01.pdf.  Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop was one of the most outspoken oppo-
nents to Babbitt’s legislative reform package in 1993. See, e.g., Senate Refuses to
Consider Range Policy Changes—Thus Far , supra note 33.  Ranching is also an im-
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mer held that Babbitt had lawfully exercised his statutory
authority when he promulgated six of the challenged regulations,
but that he had acted beyond his statutory authority190 when he
promulgated the remaining four regulations.191
Following the partial defeat, Babbitt appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.192  Remarkably, the Public Lands Council did not appeal
the six regulations the District Court upheld.193  At the time, the
Council indicated that it believed its best course of action was to
pursue a legislative solution.194  As a result, the only issue before
portant part of Wyoming’s cultural heritage. See, e.g.,  State of Wyoming, General
Wyoming Information, http://wyoming.gov/general/ general.asp (last visited Oct. 14,
2006) (explaining that the state seal pays tribute to the state’s four main industries:
oil, mines, livestock and grain); id.  (The State’s license plates feature a cowboy rid-
ing a bucking horse.); Univ. of Wyoming, Factbook: Athletics and Sports, http://
uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/uw/facts/athletics.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (University
of Wyoming athletes are known as the cowboys and cowgirls.); State of Wyoming,
Welcome to Wyoming, http://wyoming.gov/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (The state’s
home page contains an image of a cowboy riding a bronco.).  In addition to selecting
a grazing-friendly jurisdiction, the Council was fortunate enough to have Judge
Brimmer assigned to its case.  Judge Brimmer has become a controversial figure in
debates over the use of federal land.  He has invalidated regulations promulgated by
the Clinton administration that restrict the use of federal land. See, e.g. , Int’l Snow-
mobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (D. Wyo. 2004) (enjoining
the National Park Service from implementing a 2001 rule that would have reduced
snowmobile traffic in Yellowstone National Park); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003) (enjoining Forest Service regulation that
would limit activity in roadless areas).  Following his injunction of the Clinton
Roadless Rule in Wyoming , two watchdog groups—Community Rights Council, Inc.
and Citizens for Responsibility—filed an ethics complaint against Brimmer alleging
that his ownership of stock in oil and gas companies presented a conflict of interest.
Theo Stein, Wyo. Judge Cleared in Ethics Gripe , DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at
A1.
190 See infra  notes 201-360 and accompanying text (detailing Judge Brimmer’s de-
cision to overturn four of the challenged regulations).
191 The court upheld: (1) the affiliate regulations, 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110.1-1(b)(1)
(1995); (2) limits on temporary non-use, 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g) (1995); (3) exclusive
use of water diversions, 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(d) (1995); (4) suspension and cancella-
tion of grazing permits if the permittee is convicted of violating environmental laws,
43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(c) (1995); (5) surcharges on certain pasturage arrangements, 43
C.F.R. § 4130.8-1(d) (1995), and; (6) the Fundamentals of Rangeland Health, 43
C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995). See generally  Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D.
Wyo. 1996).
192 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’d  529 U.S. 728
(2000).
193 Id.  at 1293.
194 Judge Voids Four Pillars of DOI Range Policy , PUB. LANDS NEWS, June 27,
1996, at 2, 3.  The Council’s decision may have been motivated by the fact that a
friendly judicial forum had been unable to find a way to overturn Babbitt’s regula-
tions.  A Council representative said, “Judge Brimmer made clear that [Babbitt’s]
policy was outside the law. . . . The law is not clear and Congress should make it
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the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had erroneously
overturned four of the BLM’s 1995 grazing regulations.  The
Tenth Circuit voted 2-1 to reverse Judge Brimmer’s decisions on
three of the four regulations.195  The lone dissenter, Judge Tacha,
would have affirmed Judge Brimmer on three of the four
regulations.196
On October 12, 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear the Public Land Council’s appeal of the Tenth Circuit’s deci-
sion.197  Although his conservation-use regulation was over-
turned by the Tenth Circuit, Babbitt chose not to appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court.198  The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Breyer, unanimously rejected the Pub-
lic Land Council’s appeal and affirmed the Tenth Circuit.199
2. The Public Lands Council’s Challenge to Babbitt’s
Regulations
The Public Lands Council’s legal challenge sought to overturn
ten of the BLM’s 1995 grazing regulations.  Ultimately, its chal-
lenge was almost entirely rejected.  Only the regulation providing
for conservation-use permits was invalidated by the courts.200
Below is a discussion of the judicial resolution of each of Public
Lands Council’s ten legal challenges to the BLM’s 1995 grazing
regulations.
a. Elimination of the Grazing Preference
The Babbitt BLM’s 1995 regulations revised the definition of
grazing preference.  The previous regulations defined “grazing
preference” as a quantity of forage attached to a permittee’s base
property.201  The BLM’s new regulation redefined grazing prefer-
ence to indicate that it represented only the priority for obtaining
forage; the regulation no longer included any reference to a
clear.  In other areas the judge said [Babbitt’s] actions were bad ideas, but there is
nothing he could do about it.  Our first and foremost concern is to move legislation.”
Id.
195 Pub. Lands Council II , 167 F.3d at 1309.
196 Id.  at 1309-18 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
197 Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 528 U.S. 926 (1999).
198 Pub. Lands Council III, 529 U.S. 728, 739 (2000).
199 Id.  at 750.
200 See infra text accompanying note 274.
201 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994).
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quantity of forage.202  Decoupling forage-allocation priority from
forage quantity destroys the illusion that ranchers are guaranteed
any amount of forage.203  Due to the appearance of guaranteed
forage under the previous rule, ranchers strongly resisted the
BLM’s attempts to reduce the quantity of forage available to in-
dividual permittees.204
Judge Brimmer held that the BLM’s modification of the graz-
ing preference violated the TGA by failing to adequately safe-
guard grazing privileges.205  Although permittees would have a
right of renewal based on their grazing preference, Brimmer was
concerned that the BLM’s decision to eliminate the certainty of
forage allocation would mean it would be more difficult for
ranchers to obtain bank financing, and as a result, ranchers
would be forced out of the livestock business.206  Judge Brimmer
therefore held that the BLM’s redefinition of grazing preference
was unlawful because it had “boldly and blithely wrested away
from [w]estern ranchers the very certainty . . . that their livestock
operations require.”207
The Tenth Circuit rejected Brimmer’s reasoning for overturn-
ing BLM’s modification of the grazing preference definition.208
The court found no statutory requirement in the TGA or
FLPMA that would require permanent recognition of grazing
preferences.209  Moreover, both the TGA and FLPMA provided
the Secretary with the authority to adjust grazing levels to pro-
tect the range.210  Although Babbitt’s modification was com-
pelled by neither the TGA nor FLPMA, the Tenth Circuit
202 See  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995).  A definition of “permitted use” was created
to represent the quantity of forage available. Id.
203 See  43 U.S.C. § 315b (2006) (grazing permits do not create any right to
forage).
204 See, e.g. , Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. at 740-41.
205 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1440-41 (D. Wyo. 1996) (citing 43
U.S.C. § 315b).  Following the enactment of the TGA, the Interior Department en-
gaged in an extensive adjudication process to determine which applicants should be
granted permits to graze in the newly created grazing districts.  Judge Brimmer was
concerned that by eliminating the adjudicated grazing rights, Babbitt had failed to
adequately safeguard grazing rights. Id.
206 Id.  at 1441.
207 Id.
208 See  Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999).
209 See id.  at 1299-1301.
210 The TGA only requires grazing privileges to be “adequately safeguarded as
long as they are consistent with the purposes and provisions of the TGA , namely
protecting the federal rangelands and ensuring their orderly use.” Id.  at 1299 (citing
43 U.S.C. § 315b).  FLPMA gives the Secretary the authority to adjust stocking
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acknowledged that it was required to defer to reasonable inter-
pretations of federal statutes contained in administrative
regulations.211
Before the Supreme Court, the Public Lands Council argued
that the longstanding practice of defining grazing preference in
terms of a quantity of forage had created an expectation that per-
mittees had come to rely upon.212  Because of the ranchers’ reli-
ance on the existing definition, the Public Lands Council argued
that the TGA required the Secretary of the Interior to safeguard
that reliance.213  The Council also argued that without certainty
in forage allocations, banks would be less likely to loan ranchers
money.  Therefore, the financial security of public-lands ranchers
would be undermined.214  The Supreme Court was not persuaded
by the Council’s arguments.
First, the Court concluded that the TGA’s statutory provisions
requiring grazing privileges to “be adequately safeguarded” cre-
ated no absolute right to forage.215  The TGA requires the Secre-
tary of the Interior only to safeguard grazing privileges to the
extent that they are “consistent with the purposes and provi-
sions” of the statute.216  Further, the TGA expressly warns that
grazing permits “shall not  create any right, title, interest or
estate.”217
Second, the Court found the Council’s argument unpersuasive
because, even under the pre-1995 regulations, the Interior Secre-
tary retained broad authority to reduce or eliminate the forage
available to a permittee.218  For example, if a permittee failed to
use the forage allocated in his permit, the Secretary could cancel
the permit to the extent of non-use.219  The Secretary also has
levels at any time based on the condition of the range. Id.  at 1300 (citing 43 U.S.C.
§ 1752).
211 See id.  at 1302 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
212 Pub. Lands Council III, 529 U.S. 728, 740-41 (2000).
213 Id.  at 741.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.  (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994)).
217 Id.  (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b).
218 Id.  at 742.
219 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2 (1994); see Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. at 735.
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express authority under the TGA and FLPMA to “withdraw
rangeland from grazing use.”220
Finally, the Court reasoned that the regulatory change would
not necessarily lead to less security for grazing privileges.221  The
Court pointed to two statements by the BLM to support its con-
clusion.  When the BLM published final regulations in the Fed-
eral Register, it wrote that the definitional change does “‘not
cancel preference,’ and that any change is ‘merely a clarification
of terminology.’”222  The Court also relied on the BLM’s aban-
donment of its proposal to eliminate suspended AUMs as evi-
dence that the BLM did not intend to make sweeping changes to
historical forage allocation.223
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed
that the definition of grazing preference under the 1995 regula-
tions was a valid exercise of Babbitt’s statutory authority as Sec-
retary of the Interior.  Despite the legality of the 1995 definition,
the Bush administration has promulgated regulations restoring
the pre-1995 definition.224
b. Affiliate Regulations
The BLM’s 1995 regulations also added a requirement that ap-
plicants for new or renewed permits and their “affiliates” must
demonstrate “a satisfactory record of performance.”225  An “af-
filiate” is any “entity or person that controls, is controlled by, or
is under common control” with the applicant.226  Prior to Bab-
bitt’s changes, the regulations did not require applicants to
demonstrate a history of satisfactory performance and did not
include a definition of “affiliate.”227  However, Judge Brimmer
ultimately upheld the affiliate regulations on the ground that the
Secretary has broad authority under the TGA to “do ‘any and all
things necessary’ to preserve the public lands and ‘to provide for
220 Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. at 742-43 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 315f, 1712,
1752(c)).
221 Id.  at 743.
222 Id.  (citing Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed.
Reg. 9894, 9922 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100)).
223 Id. ; see supra  notes 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing removal of pro-
posals to eliminate suspended AUMs and limit permit tenure).
224 See infra  notes 375-79 and accompanying text.
225 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b) (1995).
226 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995).
227 Compare  43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b) (2005), and  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (2005), with
43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b) (1994), and  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994).
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the orderly use, improvement, and development of the
range.’”228  Based on this broad authority, Brimmer concluded
that considering the past performance of an applicant’s affiliates
was a rational exercise of the Secretary’s statutory authority.229
The Public Lands Council chose not to appeal Judge Brim-
mer’s decision upholding the 1995 definition of affiliate.230  Fur-
ther, the Bush administration elected not to modify the 1995
definition in its 2006 amendments to the grazing regulations.231
Although the 1995 definition of affiliate is a subtle change to fed-
eral grazing regulations, it has survived a court challenge and the
Bush administration’s rulemaking, and it forms part of the re-
maining legacy of Rangeland Reform ‘94.
c. Title to Range Improvements
One of the more controversial changes contained in the Bab-
bitt regulations was the provision governing the ownership of
range improvements.232  Under the previous regulations, title to
any structural or removable range improvement was shared be-
tween the permittee and the United States, based on the share of
labor and capital supplied.233  The new regulations required title
to all future range improvements to vest exclusively in the
United States.234  The regulation vesting title to range improve-
ments in the federal government exacerbated fears of financing
ruin among ranchers, because it would mean that ranchers would
lose any investment they made in range improvements.  Under
the old regulations,235 a rancher would retain title to range im-
228 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (D. Wyo. 1996) (citing 43 U.S.C.
§ 315a).
229 Id.  at 1442.
230 See  Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
231 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,503 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (maintaining the
concept of affiliates in the final regulations).
232 Babbitt’s regulations were controversial, in part, because ranchers were con-
cerned that the new regulations would increase the financial burden borne by ranch-
ers and perhaps drive many of them out of business. See, e.g. , Associated Press,
Federal Judge Reverses Portions of 1995 Rangeland Reform Rules , LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., June 15, 1996, at 3B (Livestock groups argued that Babbitt’s regulations “would
force up to 60 percent of those holding federal grazing permits off the land.”);
Michael McCabe, Ranchers Say Grazing Plan Will Ruin Them , S.F. CHRON., Nov.
13, 1993, at A1 (“Ranchers insist that their profits are so marginal that any substan-
tial change in . . . the way they are allowed to use the grazing land spells disaster.”).
233 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2 (1994).
234 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(b) (1995).
235 See  43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2 (1994).
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provements.  Additionally, a rancher could recover his invest-
ment if he had to stop grazing because his permit was not
renewed or the land was withdrawn from grazing.236
In addition to the ranchers’ financial concerns, the 1995 regula-
tion made it easier for the BLM to withdraw land from grazing.
Under the TGA, the BLM cannot withdraw land from grazing
unless it pays the affected permittees for the value of any im-
provements made on the allotment.237  By vesting title to all fu-
ture range improvements in the federal government, the 1995
regulation reduced the financial burden on the BLM associated
with withdrawing land from grazing use.
Judge Brimmer held that vesting title to range improvements
in the United States violated Congress’s intent in the TGA and
FLPMA.238  The TGA prohibits permittees from using “im-
provements constructed and owned by a prior occupant until the
applicant has paid to such prior occupant the reasonable value of
such improvements.”239  Similarly, FLPMA requires the federal
government to compensate a permittee for “his interest in au-
thorized permanent improvements placed or constructed by the
permittee” when the permit is cancelled so that the underlying
land may be put to another public purpose.240  Judge Brimmer
concluded that the BLM’s 1995 regulations conflicted with these
statutory provisions, because under the regulations permittees
would never acquire an interest requiring compensation.241
Therefore, Congress must have intended that the individual or
entity that constructed the improvement would own it.242
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Public Lands Council ar-
gued that “constructed and owned” meant that a permittee
would have an interest in any range improvement he wholly or
partially constructed.243  However, Judge Seymour, writing for
the majority, interpreted the “constructed and owned” language
to mean that “if  the Secretary allows a permittee both  to con-
struct and  own an improvement” he would be entitled to com-
236 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2006); see also id.  § 315c.
237 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g).
238 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1443 (D. Wyo. 1996).
239 43 U.S.C. § 315c.
240 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g).
241 See Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1443.
242 Id.
243 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1316 (10th Cir. 1999) (Tacha, J.,
dissenting).
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pensation under the TGA; the statute does not “require[ ]  the
Secretary to allow a permittee to own an improvement he has
constructed.”244
Further, the majority read section 402(g) of FLPMA to indi-
cate that Congress did not believe that the TGA would automati-
cally vest title to improvements in the permittee.245  FLPMA
provides compensation for the permittee’s “interest” in range im-
provements; therefore, the majority concluded that Congress
must not have believed that permittees would own every range
improvement they constructed.246  Thus, the court held that the
Babbitt BLM had based its regulation “on a permissible interpre-
tation of the TGA.”247  As a result, the court held that it was
bound to defer to Babbitt’s interpretation unless he had “failed
to provide a reasoned basis for modifying the previous
regulations.”248
The BLM supplied three reasons for modifying the previous
regulations.  First, it would be easier for the BLM to manage its
lands according to the multiple-use, sustained-yield requirement
in FLPMA if permittees did not have an interest in permanent
range improvements.249  Second, modifying the regulations to re-
quire federal ownership of range improvements on BLM land
would make federal land management more consistent because
the Forest Service already required federal ownership of perma-
nent range improvements.250  Finally, the BLM argued that its
modification would clarify management of range improvements
by eliminating a confusing provision in the previous rule that
made it difficult to determine whether title to certain range im-
provements was shared or was vested solely in the United
States.251  The majority held that due to the narrow standard of
review that applied to the case, any of the BLM’s three argu-
ments would, by itself, be a sufficient basis for upholding the new
regulation.252
244 Id.  at 1303-04 (majority opinion).
245 Id.  at 1304 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (1994)).
246 See id.  at 1304.
247 Id.  at 1305.
248 Id.  (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
249 Id. ; see also  43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2006).
250 Pub. Lands Council II , 167 F.3d at 1305.
251 Id.
252 Id.
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The Council made the same argument to the Supreme Court
that it had to the Tenth Circuit: because the TGA says “con-
structed and owned,” the BLM is required to allow permittees to
own some of the range improvements they construct.253  The Su-
preme Court responded that the permittee may still own remova-
ble range improvements,254 and a subsequent permittee would be
prohibited from using such improvements until their owner had
been compensated.255  After it addressed the Council’s chief ar-
gument, the Court simply concluded that there is nothing in the
TGA that “denies the Secretary authority reasonably to decide
when or whether to grant title to those who make improve-
ments.”256  Although the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court
upheld the 1995 regulation vesting title to range improvements in
the federal government, the Bush administration has elected to
restore the pre-1995 regulations and allow ranchers to obtain ti-
tle to range improvements.257
d. Conservation-Use Permits
The new grazing regulations authorized conservation-use per-
mits—permits for purposes other than grazing.258  A conserva-
tion-use permit would allow its holder to engage in activities
other than grazing to improve the ecological health of the range
covered by the permit.259  Before 1995, a rancher with a federal
grazing permit was required to either graze his allotment260 or
obtain permission from the BLM on a yearly basis to rest his
253 Pub. Lands Council III, 529 U.S. 728, 749 (2000).
254 Id.  at 750 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3(b) (1995)).
255 Id.  (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315f) (1994).
256 Id.
257 See infra  notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
258 See  43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (2005) (grazing permits may authorize conservation
use).
259 Id.  (Conservation use includes using an allotment for purposes of: “(1)
[p]rotecting the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury; (2)
[i]mproving rangeland conditions; or (3) [e]nhancing resource values, uses, or func-
tions.”).  Prior to the 1995 revisions to the regulations, a permittee who failed to
graze in the name of conservation would have risked cancellation of her permit. See
43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2 (1994).
260 See  43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(a)(2) (1994) (subjecting the failure to graze for two
consecutive fee years to civil penalties under 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1); 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-
2 (1994) (authorizing cancellation of a grazing preference for violation of
§ 4140.1(a)(2)).
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allotment.261  The pre-1995 regulations required a rancher to
show that temporary non-use was necessary due to drought, fire,
other natural causes, or overgrazing.262  A rancher who failed to
graze without persuading the BLM that temporary non-use was
necessary could lose his right to graze under his permit.263
The creation of conservation-use permits made it easier for
ranchers to rest allotments.  Under the 1995 regulations, a con-
servation-use permit would be approved for up to ten years if the
BLM determined that “the proposed use [would] promote range-
land resource protection or enhancement of resource values or
uses, including more rapid progress toward resource condition
objectives.”264  This is a much easier standard to satisfy than the
standard for temporary non-use.  In fact, because of the signifi-
cant environmental degradation associated with grazing on fed-
eral land265 it seems unlikely that any application for
conservation use could ever have been denied under this rule.
Further, the availability of conservation permits opened up the
possibility that conservation groups could encourage periods of
non-use by compensating ranchers who placed their allotments
into conservation use.266  The upshot is that conservation use
would have provided federal permittees with a great deal more
flexibility in determining how intensively to graze their
allotments.
In the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the TGA pre-
cluded the BLM from issuing grazing permits for purposes other
than livestock grazing.267  Judge Brimmer agreed, citing one of
the purposes of the TGA: to “provide certainty and predictability
in the livestock industry.”268  He held, therefore, that issuing per-
mits excluding livestock grazing within grazing districts estab-
261 See  Feller, supra  note 16, at 574 (describing annual process of determining a
permittee’s grazing use, including non-use); see also  43 C.F.R. § 4130.1-1 (1994) (ap-
plication for changes in grazing use); 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (definition of suspension).
262 See  43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-2(a) (1994).
263 See  43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(a)(2) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2.
264 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g)(1) (1995).
265 See, e.g. , supra  notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
266 As an example of conservation groups providing financial incentives to ranch-
ers to help further conservation objectives, consider the Defenders of Wildlife Wolf
Compensation Trust.  In its efforts to reduce opposition to wolf reintroduction, the
Defenders of Wildlife has established a trust to compensate ranchers whose live-
stock is killed by wolves.  Defenders of Wildlife, About Us, http://
www.defenders.org/about/about2.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
267 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1443 (D. Wyo. 1996).
268 Id.
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lished by the Secretary under the TGA would be contrary to
Congress’ intent, evinced in the Act itself, to make federal land
available for grazing.269
The district court’s decision regarding the lawfulness of conser-
vation-use permits was the only part of Judge Brimmer’s opinion
that the Tenth Circuit upheld.  Before the Tenth Circuit, the Bab-
bitt BLM argued that because the TGA, FLPMA, and PRIA
confer broad authority upon it to protect federal rangeland, issu-
ing conservation-use permits was a valid exercise of its statutory
authority.270  In response, the court applied Chevron  deference
analysis and concluded that the statutes were not ambiguous.271
Therefore, the BLM’s regulatory interpretation was not entitled
to deference, and the court was bound to give effect to the plain
language of the statutes.272
The Tenth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the gov-
erning statutes to preclude the issuance of conservation-use per-
mits.  The TGA gives the Interior Secretary the authority to issue
“permits to graze livestock.”273  Similarly, FLPMA and PRIA de-
fine grazing permits as “any document authorizing use of public
lands . . . for the purpose of grazing domestic livestock .”274  Based
on these statutory provisions, the court concluded that when the
Interior Secretary issues permits under the TGA, “the primary
purpose of the permit must be grazing.”275
The BLM chose not to appeal the Tenth Circuit’s decision in-
validating conservation-use permits to the Supreme Court.276
269 Id.  at 1444. See, for example, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006), which provides:
[i]n order to promote the highest use of the public lands pending its final
disposal, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to establish grazing
districts . . . of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved lands from any part
of the public domain of the United States (exclusive of Alaska) . . . which
in his opinion are chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops . . . .
See also  43 U.S.C. § 315b (The Secretary has authority “to issue or cause to be is-
sued permits to graze livestock.”).
270 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999).
271 Id.  Earlier, the court had emphasized that the Chevron  doctrine required it to
uphold reasonable interpretations of ambiguous laws. Id.  at 1293-94 (quoting Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
272 See id.  at 1307.
273 Id.  at 1307 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994)).
274 Id.  at 1307-08 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(p), 1902(c)).
275 Id.  at 1308.
276 See  Pub. Lands Council III, 529 U.S. 728, 739 (2000); see also  Brief for the
Respondents in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.6, Pub. Lands
Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000) (No. 98-1991), 1999 WL 33611468 (conced-
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Although it is not clear why the BLM chose not to appeal the
ruling, its decision meant that the Tenth Circuit would be the last
word on the legality of issuing conservation permits.  The invali-
dation of conservation-use permits dealt yet another blow to the
vision Babbitt had presented in his Rangeland Reform ‘94
proposal.277
e. Limits on Temporary Non-use
The 1995 grazing regulations authorized the BLM to approve
temporary non-use of a grazing permit for up to three consecu-
tive years.278  Babbitt added the cap on the number of consecu-
tive years of non-use in response to a 1986 recommendation from
a review of grazing management by the Office of the Inspector
General.279  The Inspector General’s examination of grazing
management practices revealed widespread abuse of the non-use
classification.  Many permittees were placing their forage in non-
use for long periods of time without a valid reason for doing
so.280  The Inspector General’s report estimated that abuse of
temporary non-use cost the BLM a million dollars in 1984
alone.281  To help curb abuses and reduce lost revenue, the Bab-
bitt BLM included an absolute three-year limit on temporary
non-use in its 1995 regulations.282
The Public Lands Council argued to Judge Brimmer that the
BLM had no rational basis for imposing a three-year limit on
non-use.283  Additionally, the Council argued that after the expi-
ration of a three-year period of non-use the new regulation
would compel permittees to graze or risk permit cancellation
even if continued non-use would improve the condition of the
land.284  By forcing permittees to graze at the end of an allegedly
ing that Babbitt was not seeking review of the Tenth Circuit’s invalidation of conser-
vation use permits).
277 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 11.
278 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g)(2) (1995).
279 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894,
9903 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
280 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (D. Wyo. 1996).  The pre-1995
regulations allowed for temporary non-use “due to drought, fire, or other natural
causes, or to facilitate installation, maintenance, or modification of range improve-
ments.” See  43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-2(a) (1994).
281 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1444.
282 Id. ; see also  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60
Fed. Reg. at 9903.
283 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1444.
284 Id.
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arbitrary three-year period, the Council argued that the BLM
had failed to provide for the possibility that poor range condi-
tions may require longer periods of non-use.285  Despite his
agreement with the Council’s position that a three-year limit on
non-use “might be bad judgment,” Judge Brimmer concluded
that because Babbitt had a rational basis for promulgating the
regulation—to reduce unused AUMs and increase revenue—it
was not arbitrary and capricious.286  Therefore, Judge Brimmer
concluded that he was powerless to overturn the regulation.287
Although the Public Lands Council chose not to appeal Brim-
mer’s decision,288 the Bush administration has vindicated the
Council’s position by eliminating the three-year cap on tempo-
rary non-use.289
f. Permittee Qualifications
Under the previous grazing regulations, permittees were re-
quired to be “engaged in the livestock business.”290  The BLM’s
1995 grazing regulations eliminated that requirement.291  The
BLM explained that removing the requirement that permittees
be engaged in the livestock business was “made necessary by the
increasing number of part time ranchers, permits held by finan-
cial institutions and other non-ranching organizations, and per-
mits where the livestock operator is in an initial developmental
stage and is not yet ready to run cattle on the range.”292  Ranch-
ers were concerned that eliminating the “livestock business” re-
quirement would allow non-ranchers who own livestock to
obtain federal grazing permits and effectively mothball them.293
In the district court, the Public Lands Council argued that
Babbitt had violated the TGA by eliminating the requirement




288 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
289 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,506 (July 12, 2006) (new 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2 eliminates three-year limit).
290 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1994).
291 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894,
9926 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
292 Id.
293 Id.  at 9925; see also  Brief for the Petitioners at 47-48, Pub. Lands Council v.
Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000) (No. 98-1991), 1999 WL 1123723.
294 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1444-45 (D. Wyo. 1996).
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Brimmer concluded, based on the text and legislative history of
the TGA,295 that Congress intended the Act to benefit those who
are “actually engaged in the livestock business.”296  Babbitt ar-
gued that eliminating the “livestock business” requirement was
necessary to allow non-traditional applicants, such as conserva-
tion organizations and banks, to hold grazing permits.297  How-
ever, Brimmer held that even the previous regulations allowed
banks and conservation organizations to hold grazing permits.298
Because the new regulation was unnecessary to achieve the
BLM’s stated goal of allowing banks and conservation organiza-
tions to hold permits, Judge Brimmer determined that Babbitt
had failed to provide a “reasoned basis” for eliminating the “en-
gaged in the livestock business” requirement and declared the
regulation unlawful.299
Before the Tenth Circuit, the Council argued that the TGA
requires grazing permittees to be “engaged in the livestock busi-
ness.”300  In support of its argument, the Council referred exten-
sively to the TGA’s legislative history.301  However, the Tenth
Circuit refused to consider the legislative history of the TGA be-
cause the language of the statute was unambiguous.302  Ulti-
mately, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Council’s argument
because it concluded that there was “not even a colorable argu-
ment that [the TGA] requires  the Secretary to issue grazing per-
mits only  to those engaged in the livestock business.”303  The
TGA merely requires the Secretary to give preference to appli-
295 Id.  at 1445 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994) & To Provide for the Orderly Use,
Improvement, and Development of the Public Range: Hearings on H.R. 2835 and
H.R. 6462 Before the S. Comm. on Public Lands , 73d Cong. 74 (1934)).
296 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1445.
297 Id. ; see also  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60
Fed. Reg. at 9925 (eliminating the “livestock business” requirement was intended to
clarify that “mortgage insurers, natural resource conservation organizations, and pri-
vate parties whose primary source of income is not the livestock business, could
meet the criteria for qualifications for a grazing permit or lease”).
298 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1445.  Judge Brimmer cited two deci-
sions of the Interior Board of Land Appeals, Forgey Ranch Co. v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt. , 116 IBLA 32 (1990), and Defenders of Wildlife , 19 IBLA 219 (1975), as
evidence that the Interior Department had allowed banks and conservation groups
to hold grazing permits. Id.
299 Id.
300 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999).
301 Id.  (citing appellee’s brief).
302 Id.
303 Id.
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cants engaged in the livestock business.304  The TGA also re-
quires the Secretary to give preference to “bona fide occupants
or settlers, [and] owners of water or water rights.”305  Because
the language of the TGA was unambiguous, Babbitt’s elimina-
tion of the “livestock business” requirement was not entitled to
Chevron  deference.306  However, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that Babbitt’s new regulation gave “proper effect to [the] unam-
biguous statutory language” of the TGA and was a lawful exer-
cise of Babbitt’s statutory authority.307
Before the Supreme Court, the Public Lands Council repeated
its argument that the TGA only allows grazing permits to be is-
sued to those engaged in the livestock business.308  To support its
argument, the Council relied on the TGA’s limits on the Secre-
tary’s authority to issue grazing permits.309  Under the TGA, the
Secretary may issue permits only to “bona fide settlers, residents,
and other stock owners.”310  The Council maintained, and Bab-
bitt conceded,311 that this language requires permittees to be
stock owners.312  The Council further argued that “stock owner
should be construed as synonymous with in the livestock business
in the popular sense,”313 because when the TGA was enacted,
stock owner meant “commercial stock owner.”314
The Court’s ultimate rejection of the Council’s argument was
based on the principle that a “statute must, if possible, be con-
strued in such fashion that every word has some operative ef-
fect.”315  Accepting the Council’s argument would mean that the
phrase “engaged in the livestock business” would be redundant
when used to modify “landowners.”316  To be eligible for a per-
mit, landowners must be stock owners.317  Yet the Secretary must
304 Id.  (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994)).
305 Id.  (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b).
306 See id.
307 Id.  at 1307.
308 Brief for the Petitioners, supra  note 293, at 43-48.
309 See id . at 43.
310 Id.  (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b).
311 See  Brief for the Respondents at 39, Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. 728 (No.
98-1991), 2000 WL 35853.
312 Brief for the Petitioners, supra  note 293, at 43-44; see also Pub. Lands Council
III , 529 U.S. at 746 (noting that only “stock owners” may hold permits).
313 Brief for the Petitioners, supra  note 293, at 44 (internal quotations omitted).
314 Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. at 746.
315 Id.  (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)).
316 See id.
317 See  43 U.S.C. § 315b (2006).
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also give preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock bus-
iness” when he issues permits.318  Because the Secretary cannot
issue permits to those who are not stock owners, the phrase “en-
gaged in the livestock business” would be redundant if stock
owners must, by definition, be “engaged in the livestock busi-
ness.”  To give effect to the phrase “engaged in the livestock bus-
iness,” stock owners must include those who are not “engaged in
the livestock business.”
In response to the Council’s argument that Congress intended
all permittees to be in the livestock business, the Court consid-
ered the legislative history of the TGA.319  However, the Court
found no indication that Congress’ intent would be frustrated if
stock owners were not required to be engaged in the livestock
business.320  As a result, the Court concluded that eliminating the
“livestock business” requirement was a lawful exercise of Bab-
bitt’s statutory authority.321  Remarkably, the Bush administra-
tion’s regulations did not restore the “livestock business”
requirement.322  As a result, the elimination of the “livestock
business” requirement is one of the lasting regulatory legacies of
Rangeland Reform ‘94.
g. Exclusive Use of Water-Related Range Improvements
Babbitt’s new regulations added a provision making it clear
that constructing a range improvement “does not confer the ex-
clusive right to use the improvement or the land affected by the
range improvement work.”323  Although the BLM failed to ex-
plain the motivation behind the change,324 the previous version
of the regulation may have impaired the BLM’s ability to allow
another permittee to graze the allotment.325
318 Id.
319 See Pub. Lands Council III , 529 U.S. at 746-47.
320 Id.
321 Id.  at 747.
322 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,503 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (listing modifica-
tions to 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1).
323 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(d) (1995).
324 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg.
9894, 9934-35 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
325 See  43 C.F.R. § 4120.3 (1994).  Under Babbitt’s regulations, when a permittee
was granted temporary non-use, the BLM could make the permittee’s unused forage
available for others to graze.  43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(h) (1995).
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The Public Lands Council’s challenge to the regulation was
limited to its application to water-related range improvements.326
The Council argued that, under the previous regulations, permit-
tees were granted exclusive use of water-related range improve-
ments, and that Babbitt had reversed course without providing
an adequate reason for doing so.327
Judge Brimmer reviewed the previous regulations and con-
cluded that the plain language of the previous regulations did not
support the Council’s contention.328  The Interior Department
had never recognized exclusive rights to range improvements,
and Babbitt’s regulation simply “clarified existing practice.”329
As a result, Brimmer upheld the regulation as a lawful exercise
of Babbitt’s statutory authority.330  The Public Lands Council
chose not to appeal Brimmer’s decision331 and the Bush adminis-
tration has allowed the regulation to stand.332
h. Conditions for Suspension or Cancellation of Grazing
Permits
The 1995 regulations added a provision that allowed the BLM
to suspend or cancel a permit if the permittee was found by a
court or administrative agency to be in violation of certain state
and federal environmental laws.333  The pre-1995 regulations in-
cluded a list of prohibited acts; the 1995 regulations simply ex-
panded the list to include violations of state and federal
environmental laws.334  The BLM expanded the list based on its
conclusion “that good stewardship of the public lands, as well as
the intent and specific language of FLPMA, are served by ex-
panding the prohibited acts section to include violations of State
326 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1445 (D. Wyo. 1996).
327 Id.
328 Id.  (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3(c) (1994)).
329 Id.  at 1445-46.
330 Id.  at 1446 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1 (1995)).
331 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
332 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,505 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (making no
change to subsection (c) of 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3).
333 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1446 (D. Wyo. 1996) (citing 43 C.F.R.
§ 4140.1(c) (1995)); see also  43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1 (1995) (full list of the remedies
available to the Interior Department).
334 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg.
9894, 9946 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100) (describing
changes made to section 4140.1).
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and Federal laws related to natural resources.”335  Additionally,
the BLM hoped that the expanded list would provide ranchers
with better notice of applicable environmental laws.336
In the district court, the Public Lands Council argued that per-
mit suspension or cancellation would constitute double punish-
ment for a single offense, in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.337  Judge Brimmer was not per-
suaded by the Council’s argument.  First, the Council brought a
facial challenge to the regulation.338  As a result, it could prevail
only by showing that under no circumstances would the regula-
tion be valid.339  However, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit separate sovereigns from imposing separate punish-
ments for the same offense.340  Therefore, if a state imposed a
punishment on a permittee for violating a state law and the Inte-
rior Department cancelled the permittee’s permit pursuant to
Babbitt’s new regulations, the punishments would be imposed by
separate sovereigns, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would not
attach.341  Because the regulation was constitutional in at least
one set of circumstances, Brimmer upheld the regulation.342  Al-
though the Public Lands Council chose not to appeal Brimmer’s
decision,343 the Bush administration’s regulations have narrowed
the circumstances in which a permittee’s violation of an environ-
mental law would trigger the cancellation of his permit.344
335 Id.  at 9947.
336 Id.
337 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1446.
338 Id.
339 Id.  (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1992)).
340 Id.  (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959)).
341 Id.
342 Id.  Although the foregoing provided a sufficient basis for his holding, Brim-
mer presented another reason that Babbitt’s regulation was constitutional.  The
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of a civil penalty in addi-
tion to a criminal sanction provided that the civil penalty “is remedial in nature and
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Id.  (citing United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1990)).  Because Babbitt’s regulation was not
punitive and was rationally related to the “legitimate goal of encouraging permittees
to act responsibly and obey federal and state environmental laws,” Brimmer held
that the regulation was a constitutional exercise of Babbitt’s statutory authority. Id.
343 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
344 See infra  notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
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i. Surcharges for Pasturing Agreements
The BLM’s 1995 grazing regulations also added a provision
that imposed a surcharge on pasturing agreements.345  In an ef-
fort “[t]o ensure that the public receives a fair return from use of
public forage,”346 the 1995 regulations imposed a surcharge on
permittees who enter into pasturing agreements that allow third
parties to graze pursuant to the permtittee’s permit.347  The regu-
latory surcharge would recover 35% of the difference between
the prevailing value for forage on private land and the federal
grazing fee.348  The BLM added the surcharge due, in part, to its
belief that pasturing agreements conferred windfall profits on the
permittee.349  The BLM was also concerned about the impact of
pasturing agreements on the permittee’s incentives to ensure
good stewardship of the allotment.350
In the district court, the Public Lands Council facially chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the surcharge.  The Council ar-
gued that the surcharge regulation violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it was overinclusive.
Specifically, the Council argued that the regulation was unconsti-
tutionally overinclusive because it imposed a surcharge on per-
mittees who failed to realize any profit from the pasturing
agreement.351
Judge Brimmer concluded that the regulation must be upheld
if it was “rationally related to a legitimate government goal.”352
Based on evidence suggesting that “a significant number of per-
mittees had profited from pasturing agreements,” Brimmer con-
cluded that a surcharge to recover the windfall profits of
pasturing agreements was “rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest,” and therefore constituted a constitutional ex-
345 See  43 C.F.R. § 4130.8-1(d) (1996).
346 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra  note 87, at 9.
347 43 C.F.R. § 4130.8-1(d).
348 Id.
349 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg.
9894, 9946 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).  Under a
pasturing agreement, a permittee sells the right to graze under his permit to another
rancher.  The result is that the permittee receives a profit by recovering the differ-
ence between the subsidized federal fee and the actual market value of the forage.
See Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1447 (D. Wyo. 1996).
350 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. at
9946.
351 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1446-47.
352 Id.  at 1447 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970)).
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ercise of Babbitt’s statutory authority.353  The Public Lands
Council chose not to appeal Judge Brimmer’s decision,354 and the
Bush administration’s regulatory changes leave the surcharge
intact.355
j. Fundamentals of Rangeland Health
The core provisions of the 1995 regulations were management
standards known as the Fundamentals of Rangeland Health
(FRH).356  The FRH authorized the BLM to change grazing
management practices to ensure the environmental health of fed-
eral rangeland.357  Remarkably, the Public Lands Council con-
ceded that Babbitt had not exceeded his statutory authority by
promulgating the FRH.358  Instead, the Council contended that
Babbitt had provided inadequate responses to critical comments
submitted during the rulemaking process.359
Judge Brimmer noted that Babbitt had dedicated ten pages of
the Final Environmental Impact Statement to responding to
comments criticizing the FRH.360  As a result, Brimmer con-
cluded that Babbitt’s promulgation of the FRH was not arbitrary
and capricious.361  Although the FRH survived the Public Lands
Council’s challenge, the Bush administration has reduced the im-
pact of the FRH by allowing the BLM to respond more slowly to
environmental degradation and by limiting the circumstances in
which the FRH apply.362
3. The Upshot of Public Lands Council v. Babbitt
After nearly five years of litigation, the federal courts held that
nine of the ten regulations challenged by the Public Lands Coun-
cil were valid exercises of Babbitt’s statutory authority.  Despite
his general hostility to restrictions on the use of federal lands,
353 Id.
354 Pub. Lands Council II, 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
355 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,507 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (43 C.F.R.
§ 4130.8-1(d) was redesignated § 4130.8-1(f) but left otherwise unchanged).
356 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES
LAW 817 (5th ed. 2002); see also  43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995).
357 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1; see also supra  notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
358 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1447-48 (D. Wyo. 1996).
359 Id.
360 Id . at 1448.
361 Id.
362 See infra  notes 402-09 and accompanying text.
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even District Court Judge Clarence Brimmer upheld six of the
ten challenged regulations.363  The Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s reversal of Brimmer on three of the
regulations bringing the total of upheld regulations to nine.  The
only regulation that was ultimately overturned by the courts was
the regulation allowing for the issuance of conservation-use
permits.364
V
THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S EFFORTS
TO END RANGELAND REFORM
The announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision in Public
Lands Council v. Babbitt  largely ended the dispute over Range-
land Reform ‘94.  However, the inauguration of George W. Bush
as the nation’s forty-third President reignited the battle over
rangeland management.  Bush campaigned in the West on a plat-
form promising to limit the federal government’s intrusion into
extractive activities; however, he remained silent on the form of
the changes he envisioned.365
Bush’s grazing agenda became clearer after his inauguration
with his appointment of Gale Norton as Secretary of the Inte-
rior.366  Norton had served in the Reagan administration as asso-
ciate solicitor at the Interior Department under James Watt.367
Prior to her tenure in the Reagan administration, Norton had
worked as a lawyer for the Watt-directed Mountain States Legal
363 See supra  note 189-91.
364 See supra  notes 258-77 and accompanying text.
365 Susan Greene, The Wooing of the West: Conservation Question Weighs Needs
of Few, Wants of Many , DENVER POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at A1.
366 Mike Soraghan & Jim Hughes, Norton Gets Interior Post, But Eco-groups
Wary , DENVER POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at A1.  Western land users generally praised
Norton’s appointment. See id.  (The Executive Director of the Blue Ribbon Coali-
tion approved of the nomination: “I think that Gale is an excellent choice. Frankly,
with a more accommodating [I]nterior [S]ecretary, we’re expecting to make some
real progress getting our federal land-management agencies on the road toward a
more user-friendly attitude.”).  Environmentalists, on the other hand, were less-
than-pleased by her appointment. See  Bill Dawson, Disputes Cloud Norton’s Nomi-
nation to Lead Interior , HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 18, 2001, at A6 (The Sierra Club
charged that Norton “will be nothing more than ‘James Watt in a skirt.’”); Al
Knight, The Babbitt Legacy Advice to GOP: It’s Best to Skip the Flash and Dash ,
DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 2001, at G1 (The President of Friends of the Earth likened
Norton’s appointment to “a declaration of war on the environment.”).
367 William Booth, For Norton, A Party Mission; Nominee Fights GOP Environ-
mental Image , WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2001, at A1.
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Foundation.368  Several months later, Bush nominated Kathleen
Clarke to serve as his BLM Director.369  Clarke is a less-polariz-
ing figure than Norton, but neither side of the debate over public
lands was particularly pleased with her.  Environmentalists were
worried about her close ties to extractive industries.370  Conserv-
atives were concerned by her support of a bill that would in-
crease federal land acquisition.371
In a speech to the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association on
January 30, 2003, Clarke announced her proposal to rewrite the
BLM’s grazing regulations.372  According to Clarke, the pro-
posed changes would “enhance community-based conservation,”
“promote cooperative stewardship of the public rangelands,”
“improve BLM business practices,” and “provide greater flexibil-
ity to managers and grazing permittees.”373  On March 3, 2003,
Clarke formally declared her intent to amend the BLM’s grazing
regulations.374  Approximately nine months later, the BLM pro-
posed new grazing regulations.375
A. Vindicating the Public Lands Council’s Challenge
to Babbitt’s Reform
On July 12, 2006, the BLM published its final regulations.376
Although Norton resigned her post as Interior Secretary prior to
368 Id.  The Mountain States Legal Foundation is a conservative property-rights
advocacy organization “dedicated to individual liberty, the right to own and use
property, limited and ethical government and the free enterprise system.”  Mountain
States Legal Found., http://www.mountainstateslegal.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
369 Bill McAllister, Utah Resources Chief to Lead BLM , DENVER POST, Aug. 28,
2001, at A8.
370 Christine Dorsey, ‘Use and Protect’: Bush Picks Utah Official to Take Charge
of BLM , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 28, 2001, at 2B (A representative of the South-
ern Utah Wilderness Alliance claimed that “[s]he’s tended to side with the extractive
industries.”).
371 Id.  (statement by a representative of the American Land Rights Association).
372 Mike Soraghan, Eased Cattle-Grazing Rules Sought , DENVER POST, Jan. 31,
2003, at A4.
373 Id.
374 See  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Proposed Amendments to
the BLM’s Grazing Administration Regulations and Announcement of Public Meet-
ings, 68 Fed. Reg. 9964, 9964 (Mar. 3, 2003).
375 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,452, 68,452 (proposed Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).
376 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,402 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).
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the promulgation of the final regulations,377 her successor, for-
mer Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne,378 promulgated the final
regulations without making any significant substantive changes
to the proposed regulations.
In addition to a few minor technical changes,379 the new regu-
lations undo significant parts of the regulations the Babbitt BLM
promulgated in 1995.  Further, the new regulations vindicate
much of the Public Lands Council’s largely unsuccessful legal
challenge to the regulations.  Of the nine provisions unsuccess-
fully challenged by the Public Lands Council in Public Lands
Council v. Babbitt , the new regulations amended five.
1. Elimination of the Grazing Preference
Although the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld the
1995 definition of grazing preference, the Bush administration
nevertheless proposed to restore the pre-1995 definition.380  The
Babbitt BLM had amended the definition of “grazing prefer-
ence” to “clarify that [grazing preference] refers only to a per-
son’s priority to receive a permit or lease, and not to a specific
number of AUMs.”381  The 1995 definition destroyed the illusion
that a permittee was guaranteed a specific number of AUMs and
forced ranchers to acknowledge that the amount of available for-
age would vary from year-to-year depending on the condition of
the range.382
377 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Norton Announces Depar-
ture from Interior (Mar. 10, 2006), available at  http://www.doi.gov/ news/
06_News_Releases/060310.htm.
378 Rocky Barker, Interior’s New Secretary—General or Foot Soldier? , HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, June 12, 2006, at 3, 3.
379 See, e.g. , Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed.
Reg. 39,402, 39,404 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (removing
references to “conservation use” to comply with the 10th Circuit’s decision in Pub.
Lands Council II , 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999)).
380 The new regulation restores the 1978 definition with two additions: (1) the
grazing preference includes suspended AUMs, and (2) grazing preference also indi-
cates a superiority of position. Compare id.  at 39,503 with  Modernization of Live-
stock Grazing Regulations for Public Lands and Addition of Provisions to Comply
With the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,058,
29,068 (July 5, 1978) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4100-4300).
381 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894,
9922 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
382 See supra  notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
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Bush’s regulation restores the illusion that ranchers have an
interest in a specific quantity of forage.383  As the right to forage
becomes more definite, efforts by the BLM to reduce grazing on
federal rangeland will be strongly opposed because of the poten-
tial such reductions have to undermine ranchers’ ability to obtain
financing on favorable terms.  Babbitt’s regulation forced permit-
tees and their banks to come to terms with the fact that federal
forage availability cannot be guaranteed.  The Bush administra-
tion has proffered two reasons for this change: Babbitt’s defini-
tion “has proven to be confusing” and restoring the old definition
would eliminate inconsistencies.384
2. Vesting Title to Range Improvements in the Federal
Government
The Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court also upheld the Bab-
bitt BLM’s decision to vest title to all permanent range improve-
ments in the federal government.  The BLM argued that this
provision was necessary to allow it to fulfill its multiple-use man-
date.385  Allowing permittees to hold title to range improvements
hinders the BLM’s ability to change its management policies be-
cause the BLM must find money to compensate for the permit-
tee’s interest in range improvements before putting the land to a
different use.386  If the BLM cannot obtain the funds to compen-
sate the permittee, it cannot devote the property to a new pur-
383 See, e.g. , Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (D. Wyo. 1996) (graz-
ing preference has been seen as a “right to place livestock on public lands”).
384 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,452, 68,458 (proposed Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).  The
Bush administration pointed to two inconsistencies in Babbitt’s regulations regard-
ing the use of “grazing preference.”  First, the regulations stated that when transfer-
ring property with a grazing preference attached to it, “the transferee shall file an
application for a grazing permit or lease to the extent of the transferred preference .”
43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-3(a)(4) (1996) (emphasis added).  The Bush administration con-
tended that because Babbitt’s definition of grazing preference is a “singular qual-
ity”—a priority position for receiving a permit—it is not possible to refer to the
“extent” of the preference, except by referring to an amount of forage which is in-
consistent with the definition itself.  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclu-
sive of Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. at 68,458.  The second inconsistency, according to the
Bush administration, is that when property with a grazing preference attached to it is
subdivided, it creates two preferences where once there was one. Id.  As a result,
the only way to make sense of “grazing preference” in this situation is to change the
definition to include an amount of forage. Id.
385 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Regulation of Livestock Grazing—
Exclusive of Alaska, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208, 43,215 (Aug. 13, 1993).
386 See  43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2006).
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pose even if the change is necessary to fulfill its multiple-use
mandate.  In the new regulations, the BLM has reversed course
and restored the pre-1995 regulation allowing title to vest in the
permittee in proportion to the cost and labor provided.387  The
stated reason for returning to the earlier version of the rule was
that allowing permittees to retain some “asset value for invest-
ments made” would encourage private investment in range
improvements.388
3. Limits on Temporary Non-use
In response to a 1986 study by the Inspector General,389 the
Babbitt BLM imposed a three-year cap on temporary non-use in
its 1995 regulations.390  The authors of the study discovered that
permittees were abusing the temporary non-use provision by al-
lowing their allotments to sit idle for multiple years without a
valid reason for doing so.391  The Wyoming District Court subse-
quently upheld the validity of the regulation, rejecting the claim
of the Public Lands Council that the Babbitt BLM had not pro-
vided a rational basis for the change.392
The new rule eliminated the three-year cap and allows the
BLM to approve temporary non-use perpetually on an annual
basis.393  The BLM explained that the change was necessary “to
provide [it] with management flexibility needed to respond to the
common occurrence of site-specific fluctuations.”394
387 Compare  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed.
Reg. 39,402, 39,505 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (amending
43 C.F.R. § 4120.3) with  43 C.F.R. § 4120.3 (1994).
388 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. at
39,410.
389 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894,
9903 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
390 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g)(2) (1995).
391 See supra  note 259 and accompanying text.  Valid reasons for suspending ac-
tive use included “drought, fire, or other natural causes, or to facilitate installation,
maintenance, or modification of range improvements.”  43 C.F.R. 4110.3-2(a)
(1994).
392 Pub. Lands Council I, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (D. Wyo. 1996).  Although
Judge Brimmer found for Babbitt, he noted that the cap “might be bad judgment.”
Id.
393 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. at
39,506 (removing temporary non-use from 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2 and adding a provision
for annual approval of temporary non-use to 43 C.F.R. § 4130.4).
394 Id.  at 39,475.
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The Babbitt BLM’s position on temporary non-use had always
been somewhat puzzling.  Its primary reason for capping tempo-
rary non-use was fiscal, not ecological.395  However, the fiscal
benefit of limiting the abuse of temporary non-use is tiny when
compared to the lost revenue that results from charging below-
market rates for federal forage.396  In contrast, imposing a cap on
temporary non-use is ecologically detrimental because it forces
permittees to graze more intensively than they might otherwise.
Further, ranchers oppose limits on temporary non-use, because it
forces them to graze or risk losing their permits.  The Babbitt
BLM never explained why it chose to promulgate a regulation
that would provide a very modest fiscal benefit at the expense of
range health and the goodwill of the ranching community.
Although the Bush administration’s elimination of the cap on
temporary non-use may result in modest ecological benefits to
the extent that it reduces grazing,397 it is nonetheless a significant
reversal of the 1995 regulations from the standpoint of tracing
the death of Rangeland Reform.  It is another example of the
Bush administration vindicating the legal claims of the Public
Lands Council and catering to the interests of the ranching
community.
4. Addition of Conditions Under Which Grazing Permits
Will Be Suspended or Cancelled
In its challenge to the 1995 regulations, the Public Lands
Council claimed that the Babbitt BLM was violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by allowing a permittee
to have a permit or lease cancelled or suspended if the permittee
is convicted of violating environmental laws.  The district court
395 See Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1444.
396 In 1991, BLM permittees grazed 13.3 million AUMs. See U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, supra  note 5, at 13.  At this level of grazing, even a modest in-
crease in the grazing fee would produce millions of dollars of annual revenue.  For
example, increasing the grazing fee by $0.10 per AUM would produce more than
$1.3 million in annual revenue.  If Babbitt had successfully promulgated his pro-
posed fee increase, the grazing fee would have been $4.28 per AUM in 1993 instead
of $1.86 per AUM. See supra  text accompanying notes 105-06.  Such an increase
would have resulted in about $32 million of additional revenue annually.  In con-
trast, abuse of temporary non-use was resulting in an annual loss to the federal trea-
sury of about $1 million. See Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1444.
397 The actual reduction in grazing that results from temporary non-use may be
very modest because the BLM may allow another operator to graze the permittee’s
forage. See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 9903.
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rejected the Council’s constitutional claim and held that the regu-
lation was rationally related to the BLM’s goal of encouraging its
permittees to adhere to state and federal law.398
The Bush administration’s new regulations narrow the scope of
the 1995 regulations.  Under those regulations, a permittee could
lose a permit for any violation that occurred on BLM land and
was related to grazing use.399  The new regulation allows the
BLM to revoke or cancel a permit only for violations that occur
while the permittee is engaged in grazing activities on the allot-
ment covered by the permit.400  As a result, the BLM has less
authority to ensure that its permittees are acting responsibly and
in compliance with state and federal environmental laws.  For ex-
ample, if a permittee establishes a pattern of egregious violations
of state and federal environmental laws, but commits his unlaw-
ful acts on land not covered by his grazing permit, the BLM
would be powerless to suspend or cancel his permit.401
5. The Fundamentals of Rangeland Health and Standards
and Guidelines
The BLM’s new rules are another blow to the vision of na-
tional standards and guidelines Babbitt articulated as part of
Rangeland Reform ‘94.402  The 1995 regulation required the
BLM to take corrective action before the start of the next grazing
season when it discovered that the range was not meeting either
the FRH or the applicable standards and guidelines.403  Under
the new rules, the BLM has more time to take action.  The Bush
398 Pub. Lands Council I , 929 F. Supp. at 1446.
399 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(c) (1995).
400 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
39,402, 39,507 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100) (listing changes to
43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(c)).
401 See id ; see also  43 U.S.C. § 1732(c) (2006).  Grazing permits must include
terms and conditions that provide for cancellation of the permit for violations of
“applicable State or Federal air or water quality standard or implementation
plan[s]” that occur while the permittee is engaged in grazing activities on public land
covered by the permit.
402 Since National Standards and Guidelines first appeared in Rangeland Reform
’94, they have been continually weakened. See, e.g. , supra  text accompanying notes
98-102 (the National Standards and Guidelines began as an ambitious reform); supra
text accompanying notes 153-60 (the National Standards and Guidelines were weak-
ened before the Babbitt BLM proposed regulations); supra  notes 170-72 and accom-
panying text (the National Standards and Guidelines were weakened again and
became the Fundamentals of Rangeland Health in the final 1995 regulations).
403 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995); 43 C.F.R. § 4180.2(c) (1995).
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regulations do not require the BLM to act until the grazing sea-
son following the completion of its consultation process in the
case of non-compliance with the Fundamentals of Rangeland
Health, or for two years in the case of non-compliance with the
applicable standards and guidelines.404
In addition to allowing the BLM to react more slowly when it
learns of range degradation, the new rules almost entirely elimi-
nate any national standards for grazing management.  Under the
1995 regulations, the FRH provided only very general national
standards for range management.405  For example, the Funda-
mentals required the BLM to ensure that watersheds were func-
tioning properly and that ecological processes were
maintained.406  But under the new rules, the BLM no longer has
an independent obligation to ensure that the conditions de-
scribed in the FRH exist on the rangeland it manages.  Instead,
regional standards and guidelines must simply be “consistent
with” the FRH.407  The rationale for eliminating the national um-
brella of the FRH is that using the regional standards and guide-
lines as the benchmark for evaluating environmental conditions
on federal rangeland will be more efficient.408  According to the
BLM, this increase in efficiency will ultimately “benefit the
environment.”409
B. What Remains of Rangeland Reform ‘94?
Rangeland Reform ‘94 was a three-part effort to reform fed-
eral grazing management: (1) amending grazing regulations, (2)
increasing the grazing fee, and (3) introducing national standards
and guidelines.  The Bush administration’s new regulations have
effectively eliminated two of three elements of the reform effort.
The proposed grazing-fee increase proved too controversial for
404 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. at
39,508-09 (making changes to 43 C.F.R. §§ 4180.1, 4180.2(c)(1)). Contra  Idaho Wa-
tersheds Project v. Hahn, 187 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that
the 1995 FRH require the BLM to take “action that results in progress toward ful-
fillment of ecological standards and guidelines by the start of the next grazing year”
when the agency determines that the standards and guidelines are not currently be-
ing met).
405 See  43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1996).
406 Id.
407 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. at
39,508 (altering 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1).
408 Id.  at 39,409.
409 Id.
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Babbitt and was abandoned before the 1995 regulations were
published.410  The national standards and guidelines have been
continually eroded.  By the time the Babbitt BLM published final
regulations, the national standards and guidelines had become
the FRH and were nearly unenforceable.411  The new regulations
promulgated by the Bush administration nearly eliminate the
Fundamentals: they no longer have any direct effect on the man-
agement of BLM rangeland.412  Instead, under the new regula-
tions, the Fundamentals are little more than a yardstick by which
the regional standards and guidelines will be measured.
The third element of Babbitt’s reform—regulatory reform—
has not been entirely eliminated.  However, the legacy of Bab-
bitt’s regulatory reform will be limited to minor adjustments.  For
example, Babbitt’s elimination of the requirement that permit-
tees be engaged in the livestock business will endure.413  Simi-
larly, the subleasing provisions that require permittees to pay a
surcharge when they sublease their allotment will survive.414
But, most of the significant regulatory reforms Babbitt proposed
have been eliminated by the Bush administration’s final regula-
tions.  Babbitt abandoned reforms of suspended non-use and
permit tenure before the final 1995 regulations were promul-
gated.415  The Tenth Circuit struck down conservation use in
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt ,416 and Bush’s regulations will
undo Babbitt’s reforms of water rights,417 title to rangeland im-
provements,418 and limits on temporary non-use.419
410 See supra  notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
411 Enforcement of the FRH was limited to “appropriate action” by the BLM.  43
C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1996).
412 See  Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 39,409, 39,508.
413 The new regulations do not include a provision that permittees be engaged in
the livestock business. Id.  at 39,503.  Although Babbitt’s regulation will endure, the
requirements that permittees own base property and actively graze their allotments
remain and will substantially limit the significance of the change. See id.  at 39,503,
39,508 (new regulations do not modify the relevant provisions of 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1
(2005) (base property requirement) and 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2 (penalty for non-use)).
414 See id.  at 39,507 (redesignating, but not altering, 43 C.F.R. § 4130.8-1(d)).
415 See supra  notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
416 167 F.3d 1287, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999).
417 Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. at
39,505 (proposed changes to 43 C.F.R. §§ 4120.3-9).
418 Id.  (proposed change to 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2).
419 Id.  at 39,506 (proposed change to 43 C.F.R. § 4130.4(d)).
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Promulgation of the Bush administration’s final regulations
drove the final nail into the coffin of Babbitt’s reform efforts.  It
will almost be as though Rangeland Reform ‘94 never existed.
VI
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE DEATH OF
RANGELAND REFORM
The death of Rangeland Reform is illustrative of the influence
the ranching industry has over federal grazing management.  Ex-
amining the death of Rangeland Reform ‘94 through the lens of
public choice theory helps explain why the ranchers were ulti-
mately so successful.
A. The Birth of Rangeland Reform
One of the sharpest criticisms of public choice theory is its fail-
ure to account for ideology.  For example, public choice theory
cannot account for voting.  A rational economic actor would not
vote, the costs are too high and the benefits are too small.  Yet,
millions of Americans vote.
Similarly, public choice theory does not account for the birth
of Rangeland Reform ‘94.  First, grazing was nearly nonexistent
as a campaign issue for Bill Clinton; grazing reform was not nec-
essary to fulfill any promise to the electorate.  Second, grazing
reform imposes a cost on a small, well-organized group for the
benefit of a large, undifferentiated group.  Under these circum-
stances, public choice cannot account for the rise of Rangeland
Reform ‘94.  Rangeland Reform ‘94 was instead a product of
Babbitt’s ideological belief that grazing could, and should, be
managed to protect both ecological resources and ranchers.420
Although public choice theory may be instructive in certain cir-
cumstances, its reach is clearly limited by its expectation that all
actors always behave in an economically rational way.
B. Legislative Efforts
In the fall of 1993, Babbitt worked with congressional Demo-
crats to implement his grazing reforms legislatively.421  Public
choice theory predicts that legislation to reform grazing would be
quite difficult to pass because ranchers are well-organized, op-
420 See supra  notes 67, 75 and accompanying text.
421 See supra  notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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posed to changes in the status quo, and protective of their own
economic interests.422
Public choice theory accurately predicted that public-lands
ranchers would have a disproportionate impact on the resolution
of Babbitt’s legislative proposal.  Very few people, constituting a
small fraction of U.S. beef producers, rely on public lands for
grazing.423  Yet despite their small numbers, ranchers created
substantial opposition to Babbitt’s proposal.  Although Babbitt’s
bill passed in the House of Representatives with relative ease,
nearly a quarter of the House opposed the proposal.424  The
ranchers’ disproportionate impact is particularly evident in the
eleven western states where federal grazing is concentrated.425
House members from the eleven western states voted to approve
the grazing amendment by a much smaller margin: 48-41.426
Outside of California, House members from the other ten graz-
ing states disapproved Babbitt’s amendment 21-16.427  The influ-
ence of the ranchers was even more dramatic in the Senate,
where more than 40% of the chamber joined the filibuster that
ultimately ended Babbitt’s legislative reform efforts.428  Senators
from the eleven western grazing states were particularly support-
ive of the filibuster: they voted 16-6 to maintain the filibuster.429
Due to their disproportionate impact on the legislative process,
422 See supra  note 46 and accompanying text.
423 See supra  notes 1-5.
424 See Filibuster Still Has Range Policy Trapped; One More Try , supra  note 118,
at 4 (bill passed in the House by a vote of 317-106).
425 The eleven western grazing states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See
supra  notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
426 See  139 CONG. REC. H8293-94 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993) (roll call vote on
amending H.R. 2520 with Babbitt’s grazing reform package); CLERK OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICIAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE: ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 1-12
(1995), available at  http://clerk.house.gov/103/olm103.pdf.
427 See  139 CONG. REC. H8293-94 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993) (roll call vote on
amending H.R. 2520 with Babbitt’s grazing reform package); CLERK OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra  note 426, at 1-12.
428 Filibuster Still Has Range Policy Trapped; One More Try , supra  note 118, at 4-
5. Senators failed to break up the filibuster by a vote of 53-41.  Sixty votes are re-
quired to end a filibuster. RICHARD S. BETH & STANLEY BACH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., LIBRRY OF CONGRESS, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE CRS-1
(2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/ pdf/RL30360.pdf.
429 See  139 CONG. REC. S14,191 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1993) (roll call vote on motion
to end debate on H.R. 2520); CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra
note 426, at 13 (listing Senators of the 103d Congress by state).
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ranchers were able to defeat Babbitt’s attempt to enact his graz-
ing reforms into law.
Because the benefits of rangeland reform are modest and
widespread,430 and the costs are concentrated on the ranching
community, public choice theory predicts that legislators would
delegate the reform to an agency like the BLM.431  The ranchers’
victory in the Senate led exactly to that result: Babbitt and the
BLM were forced to pursue federal grazing reform
administratively.432
C. Administrative Reform
After the defeat of the grazing-reform bill in November 1993,
Rangeland Reform ‘94 became an entirely administrative effort.
Public choice theory predicts that public lands ranchers will wield
substantial influence over the BLM because of their economic
motivation and their familiarity with the agency and its regula-
tions.  The agency is unlikely to be rewarded for conservation
efforts because the beneficiaries of the improved ecological
health of public rangeland are large in number and undifferenti-
ated in their interest.  On the other hand, if the BLM angers the
ranching community, it risks creating a significant opponent that
may jeopardize the agency’s continued funding.433  The predic-
tions of Niskanen’s “budget maximizing” theory of agency be-
havior,434 combined with public choice theory, are empirically
supported by the death of rangeland reform.
Babbitt’s initial reform proposal was hardly radical.  For exam-
ple, it resulted in no significant reduction in the extent of BLM
grazing.435  Babbitt, a centrist on grazing, believed Rangeland
Reform ‘94 to be a common-sense approach to reform.  How-
430 Every citizen in the country ostensibly benefits from the improved ecological
health of public rangeland.
431 The delegation would likely take one of two forms.  The first possibility would
be for Congress to pass legislation establishing broad goals and allow the agency to
fill in the details.  The second possibility would be for Congress to simply defeat the
legislation and allow the agency to exercise its existing regulatory authority.
432 See supra  notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
433 This result is predicted by the intersection of Niskanen’s “budget maximiza-
tion” theory and public choice theory.  The basic theory is that a legislator is unlikely
to continue to fund or delegate authority to an agency that is persistently angering
her constituents.  Therefore, an agency will act to avoid angering the parties it regu-
lates. See supra  notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
434 Id.
435 Many environmentalists have advocated for substantial reductions in the ex-
tent of grazing on BLM land. See, e.g. , supra  note 31.
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ever, ranchers made it clear that they were dissatisfied with the
proposal, and, as a result, Babbitt softened the proposal before
publishing his proposed regulations.436  The grazing-fee increase
became an incentive-based fee.437  The national standards and
guidelines were progressively weakened.438  Yet, the ranching
community was still not satisfied, and Babbitt continued to dilute
his proposal.  By the time the final regulations were published,
the proposed grazing fee had vanished and the national stan-
dards and guidelines were further weakened.439  The BLM under
the George W. Bush administration has now promulgated new




The death of Rangeland Reform ‘94 should instruct future re-
form efforts in at least four ways.  First, grazing reform is unlikely
to succeed legislatively.  Public choice theory predicts that ranch-
ers will have a disproportionate impact on the political process
and are likely to be successful in their efforts to defeat legislative
grazing reform proposals.441  The fate of Babbitt’s reform efforts
supports the grim predictions of public choice theory.442
Second, regulatory reform is possible.  However, as this Article
reveals, radical or rapid reform is unlikely.  Ranchers successfully
diluted the impact of Babbitt’s initial reform and have succeeded
in overturning many of the key 1995 regulations.  Despite the
Bush administration’s elimination of the major provisions of the
1995 regulations, the regulations were a substantial improvement
436 See supra  Parts III.C.1-3.
437 See supra  notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
438 See supra  notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
439 See supra  notes 163-64, 170-72 and accompanying text.
440 See supra  Part V.B.
441 In addition to the disproportionate impact predicted by public choice theory,
the makeup of the United States Senate amplifies the impact of ranching interests.
The ten western states, excluding California, where the federal range is concentrated
contain less than 10% of the total population of the United States but control 20%
of the votes in the Senate. See  U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Comparison Table
GCT-PH1: Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density:  2000, http://
factfinder.census.gov (follow “Search” hyperlink; then search “GCT-PH1”; then fol-
low “United States by States, and Puerto Rico” hyperlink) (of the 281 million who
live in the U.S., 27.5 million live in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
442 See supra  notes Part I.
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to the existing regulations and changed federal grazing for more
than a decade.  Further, a handful of the provisions of the 1995
reform effort—admittedly representing the effort’s most modest
reforms—will survive the Bush administration’s changes.
Third, future reforms should focus on changes that are sup-
ported by the ranching community.  Many ranchers believe that
it is in their best interest to provide for the long-term health of
the range.443  Although such reforms will tend to result in modest
improvements in the condition of the federal range, they are an
important first step.  In his effort to implement Rangeland Re-
form ‘94, Babbitt’s efforts to build consensus with ranchers began
only after he encountered substantial opposition to his initial
proposal and his legislative proposal had been defeated.444  Simi-
larly, future reform efforts should avoid reforms that polarize the
ranching community.  For example, increases in the grazing fee
and other direct threats to the financial viability of ranching (e.g.,
elimination of the grazing preference) are likely to face strong
opposition from ranchers that may doom the entire reform
effort.
Finally, regulatory reform may not be the most expedient way
to improve the health of the federal range.  As the death of
Rangeland Reform ‘94 shows, regulatory reform is an arduous
process and the gains realized are easily reversed.  However, the
TGA and FLPMA confer upon the Interior Secretary broad au-
thority to withdraw land from grazing use.445  Although a subse-
quent Interior Secretary could easily use the same authority to
restore grazing, using this authority to rest the most damaged
and fragile allotments could dramatically improve the health of
the federal range.446
443 See, e.g. , Nat’l Cattlemen’s Beef Ass’n, Who is Today’s Rancher?, http://
web.archive.org/web/20040607161644/www.beef.org/dsp/dsp_content.cfm?location
Id=30&contentTypeId=1&contentId=206 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (“Success today
in the ranching business requires the rancher to be a conservationist. . . . He knows
that if he is to survive and pass his ranch on to his children, he can’t abuse the land
he is dependent upon for his survival.”).
444 See supra  notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
445 See, e.g.,  43 U.S.C. § 315a (2006) (granting the Secretary the authority to “do
any and all things necessary . . . to preserve the land and its resources from destruc-
tion and unnecessary injury”); id.  § 1712 (investing the Secretary with broad author-
ity to define how public lands are used).
446 See  Feller, supra  note 16, at 572-73 (noting that reducing grazing on BLM
lands could have positive ecological effects).
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As predicted by public choice theory and demonstrated by the
battle over Rangeland Reform ‘94, the prognosis for reform is
grim.  Regulatory reform promises to be a long and slow process;
only the most modest reforms are likely to survive efforts by
ranchers to protect the status quo.  Rangeland Reform ‘94 and
the 1995 regulations that resulted were an important step toward
improving the condition of the federal range.  However, due to
the political influence of ranchers, the direct impact of the regu-
lations was modest and relatively brief.
Grazing reform is still needed.  The federal range has been
badly damaged by decades of overgrazing,447 but restoring the
health of the federal range will require patience and persever-
ance to overcome the disproportionate political impact of ranch-
ers and their allies.
447 See supra  notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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